DateKeys/testdata/README.md

# DateKeys test data

Official vectors, fixtures and corpora of the DateKeys Protocol Specification
v0.10, generated by the reference implementation. Another implementation
consumes them as they are: this file documents every format, so that no Go code
has to be read. The rules that decide each verdict are in the specification;
this file points to them, and states only what belongs to the files
themselves.

```
go run ./internal/testkit/genfixtures -out testdata
```

regenerates everything except the `.dkc` and `.dkk` fixtures, which are
generated once and frozen (spec §67). The records of each fixture
(`<name>.json`, `<name>.dkk.json`, `<name>.inspect.json`) are recomputed from
its frozen bytes, so the fixtures of v0.8.2 and v0.9 carry `"spec": "0.10"` and
the fields added since. The local gate (`scripts/check.sh`) and CI run it and
fail if any committed file changes: every file below is exactly what the
implementation computes today.

Conventions for every file:

- JSON in UTF-8, with LF line endings. Binary values are lowercase hex strings.
- `error`, `result` and similar fields hold the normative codes of spec §69, such
  as `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`.
- `step` is a step of the reading flow of spec §63, 1 to 18. Steps 1 to 8 are the
  pre-unlock checks (`datekeys inspect`, `capsule.Inspect`): no network, no
  secret.
- The `spec` field names the version of the specification.
- `format` is a capsule format, the `VERSION` of the PRELUDE (spec §22): 1, 2
  or 3. A writer produces format 3 only; formats 1 and 2, those of v0.8.2 and
  v0.9, are still read (spec §70).

| File | Content | Spec |
|---|---|---|
| `vectors/profile_quicknet.json` | Quicknet Provider Profile: its canonical CBOR and `profile_hash` | §11, §12 |
| `vectors/quicknet_rounds.json` | date → round resolution | §15, §16, §65 |
| `vectors/dk1.json` | canonical `dk1_` strings, and rejected encodings with their code | §18, §19, §66 |
| `vectors/cbor.json` | the CBOR profile, and one block of vectors per schema, CONTROL_CBOR in the three formats | §58, CDDL |
| `vectors/tlock_ibe.json` | H2 of the tlock IBE: the serialization of an element of GT | §63 step 11 |
| `vectors/padding.json` | the padding of formats 2 and 3: P for each content length L, and the length of PAYLOAD_AGE | §29.1 |
| `vectors/paths.json` | the paths of a format 3 head: the rules of one entry, and those of the paths of a head | §29.5 |
| `vectors/path_fold.json` | the key of R7 of segments, and their NFD | §29.5, §29.5.1 |
| `vectors/head_schema.json` | heads of format 3 and the result of decoding them | §29.4 to §29.6, §69.1 |
| `vectors/security.json` | security areas of format 3 and their verdicts | §29.3, §29.7 |
| `vectors/ed25519_strict.json` | Ed25519 signatures and the result of the strict profile of the author signature | v0.11 §29.9 |
| `vectors/mutations.json` | the mutation corpus: the 169 mutations of §64 and further cases | §63, §64 |
| `vectors/inspect_differential.json` | 5110 mutations of fourteen fixtures with the verdict of steps 1 to 8 | §63 |
| `fixtures/<name>.dkc`, `<name>.json` | official capsules and every intermediate value | §67 |
| `fixtures/<name>.dkk`, `<name>.dkk.json` | official access keys | §68 |
| `fixtures/<name>.plaintext` | the content of each capsule: what the reader delivers in formats 1 and 2, without the padding of format 2, and in format 3 BODY, whose files its record lays out | §67 |
| `fixtures/<name>.inspect.json` | the exact output of `datekeys inspect -json` for each `.dkc` | §63 |

There are twenty-one official capsules. Five are in format 1, the fixtures of
v0.8.2, kept for compatibility: `time_only`, `time_only_extensions`,
`time_and_key_portable`, `time_and_key_recipients` and `empty_payload`. Seven
are in format 2, the fixtures of v0.9, kept for compatibility too:

| Fixture | Policy | Credentials | L | Padding code | P |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `format2_time_only` | `time_only` | — | 78000 | 2, reforzado | 79872 |
| `format2_time_only_bloque256` | `time_only` | — | 78000, the same content | 1, bloque256 | 78080 |
| `format2_empty_payload` | `time_only` | — | 0 | 2 | 256 |
| `format2_time_only_extensions` | `time_only` | — | 34 | 2 | 256 |
| `format2_time_and_key_portable` | `time_and_key` | a portable `.dkk`; 15 dummies | 46 | 2 | 256 |
| `format2_time_and_key_recipients` | `time_and_key` | a portable `.dkk` and three X25519 identities; 12 dummies | 41 | 2 | 256 |
| `format2_time_and_key_sixteen` | `time_and_key` | sixteen X25519 identities; no dummy | 41 | 2 | 256 |

The first two have a P above 64 KiB, so their PAYLOAD_AGE has two STREAM
chunks. `format2_time_only_extensions` carries a noncritical PUBLIC_HEADER
extension and a noncritical CONTROL_CBOR extension. The release that opens each
capsule, a published Quicknet signature, is in its `<name>.json`, so they all
decrypt offline.

Twelve are in format 3. Their plaintext file is BODY, L bytes: the frame, the
security area, the head and the files (spec §29.2).

| Fixture | Policy | Files | Comment | L | Padding code | P | Area | Verdicts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `format3_single` | `time_only` | 1, `nota.txt`, with mtime | — | 659 | 2 | 768 | 512 | F0, S0 |
| `format3_tree` | `time_only` | 5 in three folders, one of 80000 bytes, one without mtime | two lines, and a declared author | 84078 | 2 | 86016 | 512 | F0, S0 |
| `format3_comment_only` | `time_only` | — | two lines, the second with a TAB, and a declared author | 636 | 2 | 768 | 512 | F0, S0 |
| `format3_bloque256` | `time_only` | 1 of 20000 bytes | — | 20644 | 1 | 20736 | 512 | F0, S0 |
| `format3_time_and_key_portable` | `time_and_key`, a portable `.dkk` and 15 dummies | 1 | — | 688 | 2 | 768 | 512 | F0, S0 |
| `format3_area_1024` | `time_only` | 1 | — | 1171 | 2 | 1280 | 1024 | F0, S0 |
| `format3_security_v2` | `time_only` | 1 | — | 659 | 2 | 768 | 512 | X |
| `format3_signature_unsupported` | `time_only` | 1 | — | 659 | 2 | 768 | 512 | F1, S0 |
| `format3_seal_unsupported` | `time_only` | 1 | — | 659 | 2 | 768 | 512 | F1, S1 |
| `format3_signed` | `time_only` | 1, `nota.txt`, with mtime | — | 32915 | 2 | 34816 | 32768 | F4, S0 |
| `format3_signed_cms` | `time_only` | 1, `nota.txt`, with mtime | — | 32915 | 2 | 34816 | 32768 | F6, S0 |
| `format3_sealed` | `time_only` | 1, `nota.txt`, with mtime | — | 32915 | 2 | 34816 | 32768 | F4, S4 |

The first five were written by a writer of v0.10, with the area of 512 bytes;
a writer of v0.11 writes the area of 32768 bytes, as in the last three, which
`capsule.EncryptFiles` writes with a signer and a sealer. The next four only a
generator of test vectors may write (spec §62.1 rule 13): an area larger than
512 bytes, a security map of version 2, which a reader of this version cannot
read, an author signature of `alg` 4294967295, an `alg` that no version
defines, with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64, and that
with a seal of `seal_type` 1 and a random token of 32 bytes. None of them has
a verdict that stops the opening.

The last three are signed and sealed with test keys (spec v0.11, §29.8 to
§29.11), and their record has a `signature` object, and `seal` in the third:

- `format3_signed`: `alg` 1. The seed of the test key, which is not a secret,
  is in `secret_seed`: Ed25519 is deterministic, so signing `author_message`
  with it gives `signature` again. Opening it gives F4 and the key `author_key`,
  `dkauthor1…`; with that key among the saved ones, F3.
- `format3_signed_cms`: `alg` 2, two certificates, an ECDSA P-256 one and an
  RSA 2048 one, each with a seal CAdES-T from a test authority, dated before
  the round time. The record has `signers` (SIGNERS in hexadecimal),
  `certificates` (the DER of each), `signature` (the DER of the CMS signature)
  and `signer_results`, one for each required signer in the order of SIGNERS:
  holder, issuer that the certificate says, result, seal time, and whether the
  seal, with its accuracy, precedes the round time. The private keys are not
  kept: ECDSA and RSA-PSS are not deterministic, and a reader only verifies.
- `format3_sealed`: `alg` 1 as the first, and a seal of `seal_type` 2 over
  `SEAL_SUBJECT`. The record has `seal`: `seal_subject`, the `token` in
  hexadecimal, the `holder` of the authority as §29.7 shows it, and the time.

In the three, the record gives the commitments `control_commit`, `head_digest`
and `signers_digest`, the text `author_message` and its `author_code`, and the
exact content of key 2 of `SECURITY_CBOR`. An implementation checks them from
the control, the head and the security area of the fixture, and the verdicts
from `verdicts`. The certificates and the tokens are random, so these fixtures
are frozen once written like the others. The BODY of `format3_tree` is over two STREAM
chunks, with its head in the first.

## Edited files

`mutations.json` and `inspect_differential.json` give each mutated `.dkc` as
edits of a base file, not as its full bytes:

```json
{ "base": "time_only.dkc", "edits": [[4, 1, "04"]] }
```

- `base` is a file of `testdata/fixtures`. In `mutations.json` it may be absent:
  the base is then the empty file, and the single edit holds the whole capsule.
- An edit is `[at, delete, insert]`: the `delete` bytes at offset `at` of the
  base are replaced by the bytes of the hex string `insert`.
- The edits of one file refer to offsets of the unmodified base, are sorted by
  `at` and do not overlap. The result is therefore built in one pass: copy the
  base up to `at`, append `insert`, skip `delete` bytes of the base, go on with
  the next edit, and copy the rest of the base.
- `[0, 78799, ""]` on `time_only.dkc` is the empty file; `"edits": []` is the
  base unchanged.

## `vectors/cbor.json`

```json
{
  "spec": "0.10",
  "walk": { "max_depth": 3, "max_len": 64 },
  "accept": [ { "name": "uint 2^53 eight bytes", "hex": "1b0020000000000000", "value": "9007199254740992" } ],
  "reject": [ { "name": "tag", "hex": "c101", "error": "ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR" } ],
  "schemas": [ { "block": "extension", "schema": "public_header", "name": "65 extensions", "hex": "a600…", "result": "ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR" } ]
}
```

### Generic vectors: `accept` and `reject`

Each `hex` is checked as exactly one data item of the CBOR profile of spec §58:
major types 0, 2, 3, 4 and 5 only; integers and lengths in their shortest form;
definite lengths; map keys that are unsigned integers in strictly ascending
order; valid UTF-8 text; nothing after the item. `accept` holds the inputs that
pass, `reject` those that fail, all with `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`.

The `walk` limits apply as well, as in the reference `codec.Walk`: containers
nest at most `max_depth` deep (a scalar has depth 0, `81818100` has depth 3),
and every byte string and text string has at most `max_len` bytes, every array
at most `max_len` items and every map at most `max_len` entries. The vectors
named "above max_len" or "above max_depth" fail on these limits only.

`value` is present for an accepted unsigned integer: a JSON number up to
2^53 − 1, and a decimal string above, so that no reader loses precision.

Among them: shortest-form boundaries, `a200010101` (the two-key map
`{0: 1, 1: 1}`), a text with a leading BOM, keys out of order or repeated,
non-integer keys, indefinite lengths, tags, floats, simple values, negative
integers, truncation, lengths beyond the input, trailing bytes, overlong UTF-8
and surrogates.

### Schema vectors: `schemas`

Each vector is one encoded object:

- `schema` names the object and the decoder to run on `hex`:
  - `provider_profile`: a Provider Profile (§11), decoded and then validated
    as a profile to pin, by rules 1 to 3 of spec §12.1 in their order: the
    CDDL with the `period` limit of the reference, the field rules
    (`ERR_UNKNOWN_PROFILE`) and the chain-hash self-check
    (`ERR_PROFILE_MISMATCH`), whose formula §12.1 gives. No `profile_hash` is
    expected (rule 4). A vector that changes a hashed key recomputes
    `chain_hash`, unless its name says that the chain hash no longer matches.
  - `public_header`: PUBLIC_HEADER (§24). No profile registry is consulted and
    no extension is known: a header naming an unpinned profile is valid here
    (`ERR_UNKNOWN_PROFILE` comes from the registry at step 4), and critical
    extensions are not checked here.
  - `control_cbor`: CONTROL_CBOR (§31), decoded for the capsule format given
    by `format`, 1 when the field is absent: the schema version must equal it
    (another is `ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION`, layer 2), and keys 6,
    `payload_length`, and 7, `padding`, are required in formats 2 and 3 and
    not defined in format 1. The names of the vectors of formats 2 and 3
    start with "format 2: " and "format 3: ".
  - `dkk_body`: BODY_CBOR of a `.dkk` (§41), without the 12-byte DKK1
    prelude.
- `block` names the schema the vector exercises: the same as `schema`, or
  `verification_metadata` (the `.dkk` body's key 6 varies) or `extension` (the
  PUBLIC_HEADER's key 6, `noncritical_extensions`, varies).
- `result` is `ok` or the error code.

When bytes break several rules, the code is the one of the first failing
layer of spec §69.1: the type tag and the schema version, read first from keys
0 and 1 (layer 2), then the CDDL, the implementation limits included, and the
re-encoding (layer 3), and only then the fields with codes of their own in
ascending key order (layer 4). The objects of these vectors have no frame, so
layer 1 does not apply, and their critical extensions are not checked (see
above).

Each block has a minimal valid object, an unknown key, a missing required key, a
wrong type and values out of size or range. The `extension` block has, besides:
data `40` (empty) and `5801xx` (length not in its shortest form), data of every
other type (text, `null`, integer, map, array, tag, indefinite length), 64 and
65 extensions, an `extension_id` starting with a BOM, the pair U+FF61 and
U+10000 in UTF-8 byte order (valid) and in UTF-16 order (invalid), and
`extension_version` 2^32 − 1 (valid), 2^32 and 2^53 (invalid).

The `control_cbor` block has, besides, a key 6 in format 1, where it is not
defined, and in format 2: the minimal control of 103 bytes (L = 0),
`payload_length` 78000, 2^32 + 1 and L_MAX = 2^53 − 2^46 (valid), L_MAX + 1,
2^53 and 2^64 − 1 (invalid), a `payload_length` of 7 or 9 bytes, as an
unsigned integer or with a length not in its shortest form, `padding` 1
(valid), 0, 3, 257 and as a byte string, a missing key 6 or 7, keys 6 and 7
out of order, an unknown key 8, and schema versions 1 and 3
(`ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION`); and in format 3: the minimal control, both
extension arrays, `payload_length` 84078 with `padding` 1 (valid),
`payload_length` L_MAX + 1, a missing key 6 or 7, schema version 3 without
keys 6 and 7, and schema versions 1, 2 and 4 (`ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION`).

#### Implementation limits

The vectors apply the implementation limits of the reference that spec §74
lists: the maximum `extension_id` length, the Provider Profile `period` of one
day, the maximum name lengths and the `public_key` length. The vectors named
"the implementation limit" sit at a limit and are valid; those named "above
the implementation limit" go one past it and are otherwise valid, so that an
implementation without the limit accepts them. The name alphabets, the
`genesis_time` range and the drand rules of the `provider_profile`
validation are not limits: they are rules of spec §12.1. Neither is the
minimum of one byte of `extension_id` (spec §31).

## `vectors/tlock_ibe.json`

H2, the hash of an element of GT in the IBE-CCA with which tlock wraps
FK_TIME: spec §63 step 11, and the paragraph "Serialización de GT en H2" after
the flow.

```json
{
  "spec": "0.10",
  "description": "…",
  "vectors": [
    { "name": "H2(e(G1, G2)), the generators of G1 and G2", "g1": "97f1…", "g2": "93e0…", "gt": "0f41…", "h2": "cb87319f24560b5231579a09ad79f12e" }
  ]
}
```

- `g1`, `g2`: a point of G1 and one of G2 in the canonical compressed
  encoding of spec §12.2, 48 and 96 bytes; the vector uses the generators.
- `gt`: e(g1, g2), the pairing of G1 × G2 of step 11, in 576 bytes. Over the
  tower Fp2 = Fp[u]/(u² + 1), Fp6 = Fp2[v]/(v³ − (u + 1)) and
  Fp12 = Fp6[w]/(w² − v), every element is written with its coefficients from
  the highest degree to the lowest: c1 then c0 for Fp12, c2, c1 and c0 for
  Fp6, c1 then c0 for Fp2, and each element of Fp in 48 bytes big-endian. It
  is the order of kilic/bls12-381, which drand/kyber and tlock use.
- `h2`: SHA-256 of the ASCII bytes `IBE-H2` followed by `gt`, truncated to
  its first 16 bytes, the length of V.

A reader checks that its pairing of `g1` and `g2` serializes to `gt` and that
its H2 of those bytes is `h2`; the vector fixes the pairing and the
serialization at once. The same 576 bytes with the twelve coordinates of Fp in
reverse order, c0 first at every level as `Fp12.toBytes` of `@noble/curves`
writes them, give `0118eea9d5971745f71e3c94926f1717` and another FK_TIME.

## `vectors/padding.json`

The padding of the payload of a capsule of format 2 or 3, spec §29.1, where L
is the length of BODY in format 3: for each content length L, the length P of the plaintext of PAYLOAD_AGE with each code, and the
length of PAYLOAD_AGE.

```json
{
  "spec": "0.10",
  "l_max": 8936830510563328,
  "vectors": [
    { "l": 78000, "bloque256": 78080, "reforzado": 79872, "payload_age_bloque256": 78296, "payload_age_reforzado": 80088, "e": 16, "s": 5, "last_bits": 11 }
  ],
  "rejected": [8936830510563329, 9007199254740992]
}
```

- `l`: L, the length of the content.
- `bloque256`: P with code 1, 256 · ⌈L / 256⌉, at least 256. `reforzado`: P
  with code 2, the larger of that and Padmé.
- `payload_age_bloque256`, `payload_age_reforzado`: the length of PAYLOAD_AGE
  for each P, 184 + P + 16 · max(1, ⌈P / 65536⌉): an age header of one X25519
  stanza (168 bytes), the 16-byte nonce, and the P bytes in STREAM chunks of
  64 KiB with a 16-byte tag each.
- `e`, `s`, `last_bits`: the intermediate values of Padmé, E = bitlen(L) − 1,
  S = bitlen(E) and E − S; only for L > 256, and informative.
- `l_max`: L_MAX = 2^53 − 2^46, the largest L.
- `rejected`: lengths above L_MAX, which a writer rejects and which, as key 6
  of a control, are `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`.

Every number is below 2^53, so a JSON number holds it exactly. The lengths
include both sides of the boundaries where 32-bit arithmetic breaks
(2^31 − 2^25, 2^32 − 2^26, 2^32) and 2^49 − 1, the first L for which a
floating-point logarithm gives an E one too large (P does not change).

## `vectors/paths.json` and `vectors/path_fold.json`

The rules of the paths of a format 3 head, spec §29.5, with the tables of
§29.5.1. Both files name the tables they were computed with:
`"unicode_version": "18.0.0"` and `tables_digest`, the SHA-256 of the
canonical text of the generated tables, which a second implementation that
generates them from the same files can recompute.

```json
{
  "paths": [ { "name": "TAB", "path": "a\tb", "result": "R4: segment 1: control U+0009" } ],
  "trees": [ { "name": "A.txt and a.txt", "paths": ["A.txt", "a.txt"], "result": "ERR_HEAD_INVALID", "detail": "R7: path 2 collides with path 1 in segment 1" } ]
}
```

- `paths`: one path and the rules of one entry, R2, R3, R4, R4b, R5, R6, R6b,
  R6c and R10, in that order; `result` is `ok` or the violation of the first
  rule that fails, as every implementation must word it: the rule, the
  segment when it is about one, and the character as `U+` and at least four
  upper-case hexadecimal digits, never the text itself.
- `trees`: the paths of a head, each a file of 0 bytes, in the order given,
  and the result of decoding that head (see `head_schema.json`): R1 and R8
  in layer 3 (`ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`), then each entry and R7 and R9 over
  the tree in layer 4 (`ERR_HEAD_INVALID`, with its `detail`).

Among them: U+00A0, accepted, and U+3000, refused by R6c, at both ends of a
segment; the best-fit projections, the full-width forms of '/', '\', ':'
and '.', and CON.txt in full-width forms; 8.3 aliases, `~1` alone included;
unassigned code points and noncharacters; U+206A to U+206F, the tags and other
ignorables outside the whitelist; a dot followed by ZWJ and a segment of ZWJ
alone; 127 and 85 times U+0390; U+F03A; `.datekeys-x` at the first level and
at another; U+FF5E and U+1F600 in both orders; `ab` with and without ZWNJ;
U+00BF, U+00A7 and U+2665, accepted; VS16 after U+2764 and after `a`; ZWJ at
the start, at the end and twice; the rainbow flag, accepted, and the flag of
Scotland, refused; and `["b/..", "a"]`, an error of R8 before R3.

`path_fold.json` gives, for each `segment`, its `nfd` and its `key` of R7,
NFD(fold(NFD(s'))) with s' the segment without ZWNJ, ZWJ, VS15 and VS16:
among them the entries F of CaseFolding, the dotless i, the Kelvin and
Angstrom signs, Cherokee, Hangul, the canonical order of two marks, and the
whitelist dropped before NFD.

## `vectors/head_schema.json`

Heads of format 3, HEAD_CBOR, and the result of decoding them with no
extension known (spec §29.4 to §29.6): `ok`, or the code of the first
failing layer of §69.1. A head is decoded alone: the frame of BODY that
bounds it and the files it lays out are not checked here (spec §63 steps
17.2 and 17.5).

```json
{ "name": "a comment with U+202E", "hex": "a4006d…", "result": "ERR_HEAD_INVALID", "detail": "comment: text: bidirectional control U+202E" }
```

- Layer 2: the type tag and version 1; another type tag is
  `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`, another version `ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION`.
- Layer 3: the CDDL with its sizes and ranges, R1 and R8, and the equality
  with the re-encoding: `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`.
- Layer 4, in key order: the comment and the declared author (§29.6), then
  each file with R2 to R6c, R4b and R10 and its layout, then R7 and R9 over
  the tree, all `ERR_HEAD_INVALID`, and then the critical extensions,
  `ERR_EXTENSION_CRITICAL_UNKNOWN` with no extension known.
- `detail`, for `ERR_HEAD_INVALID` only: the violation as every
  implementation must word it, `comment: text: …`, `declared author:
  text: …`, `file N: …` for an entry, counted from 1, or the violation of the
  tree.

Besides the cases of each layer, it has a comment with tags that spell a
text, one with VS16 after a letter and one with a run of variation
selectors, one with VS17, one with CR LF, and the precedence of a comment and
a path that both break, and of a path that breaks and an unknown critical
extension.

## `vectors/security.json`

Security areas of format 3, SECURITY_CBOR exactly as its SECURITY_LEN bytes,
and their verdicts (spec §29.3, §29.7), which never stop the opening. This
version implements no `alg` and no `seal_type`, so a reader of it reaches X,
F0, F1, S0, S1 and S2 only.

```json
{ "name": "a signature of alg 0, and the seal intact", "hex": "a4006f…", "signature": "F1", "seal": "S1" }
```

X stands for both, when the outer map fails its layer 2 or 3: key 2 that is
not a byte string, or an empty one, an unknown key 4, a byte more after the
map, version 2, another type tag, keys out of order, an array. Otherwise the
signature and the seal are evaluated apart, and the first row of the table of
§29.7 that holds decides: `alg` 0, an empty key or content that is not CBOR
give F1 with the seal intact, and a seal that breaks its schema gives S2 even
with an unknown `seal_type`, which is read only from a seal that meets it.

## `vectors/security_cms.json`

Security areas with an author signature of `alg` 2, a CMS signature with
certificates, or a time seal of `seal_type` 2, an RFC 3161 token, each with
the context of its capsule and the verdicts of spec v0.11 §29.7, §29.10 and
§29.11. They complete `security.json`, whose areas have no valid signature or
seal. The file is frozen: the certificates and the tokens are made once, with
test keys, so a second implementation reads them and must reach the same
verdicts. Delete the file to make it again.

```json
{ "name": "alg 2: a required signer is absent", "security_cbor": "a4…",
  "context": { "control_commit": "…", "head_digest": "…", "round_time": "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z" },
  "signature": "F5", "seal": "S0", "signers": [ { "holder": "Ana López", "result": "valid", … }, { "holder": "<sha256>", "result": "absent", … } ] }
```

`context` is what a verdict needs besides `SECURITY_CBOR`; with `no_context`
the area is read as a reader of v0.10 does, without a capsule, and any
signature is F1 and any seal S1. `signers` are the results of the required
signers in the order of SIGNERS, and `foreign_signers` those that are not
required and never count. A valid seal gives `seal_holder` and `seal_time`.
The cases cover F6 with two signers, with a seal after the round time and
with a signer who is not required; F5 for an absent signer, no seal, a seal
from before the certificate was valid and a key 3 beside the signature; F2 in
the context of another head; F1 for SIGNERS out of order or empty, a signature
that is not a CMS, and the lack of a context; and, over an `alg` 1 signature,
the seals S4, S5 (also when the accuracy reaches the round time), S3 (another
subject, an authority expired at its time), S2 (a TSTInfo of version 2, not
DER), S1 (a SHA-384 imprint) and a seal over a capsule without a signature.

## `vectors/locator.json`

The extension `datekeys.capsule` of a `.dkk` and what it points to (spec
v0.11, §44.1): a `.dkc` of patterned bytes in an envelope of age whose header
(`envelope_header`) goes in the locator and whose `rest`, without a mark, is
hidden in a `host` file at `host_offset`; the locator sealed with tlock for
round 1000 (`locator_sealed`), with its plaintext of 4096 bytes
(`locator_plaintext`) and its fields; and the data of the extension
(`extension_data`), with the note `note` and the DateKey `datekey`. A reader
opens the locator with the release of round 1000 (`quicknet_rounds.json`),
finds the rest in the host, checks `rest_size`, `rest_digest` and
`capsule_digest`, and gets the `.dkc` back. The file is frozen: the envelope
and the locator hold randomness.

`padding_cases` give the length of the plaintext of the locator for the length
of its CBOR without the padding of key 6: the least multiple of 4096 that key 6
can fill exactly, which skips a multiple where the CBOR length of key 6 jumps
(a base of 4070 gives 8192). `uri_cases` give the verdict of the rules of §44.1
on an address: the scheme `https` or `ipfs`, the raw ASCII authority with no
percent sign or userinfo, a host of letters, digits and hyphens or a public IP
literal, and a port from 1 to 65535.

## `vectors/ed25519_strict.json`

Ed25519 signatures, in hexadecimal, and whether the strict profile of the
author signature accepts them (spec v0.11, §29.9): the equation of RFC 8032
without the cofactor, A and R canonical, S below ℓ and A not of small order.
They follow the cases of «Taming the many EdDSAs»: S + ℓ, the top bits of S, a
non-canonical R, the eight points of small order as A, non-canonical
encodings of A, a key of mixed order with and without the cofactor, and an R
of small order with a key of prime order, which this profile accepts.

```json
{ "name": "A of small order, the point 0 of the torsion, R the identity and S = 0", "message": "…", "public_key": "0100…", "signature": "0100…", "valid": false, "stdlib": true }
```

`stdlib` is what `crypto/ed25519` of Go answers, for the record: where it is
true and `valid` is false, an implementation needs the checks of the profile
before the equation, as `internal/ed25519strict` does.

## `vectors/mutations.json`

The mutation corpus of spec §64, as frozen data. Each case is a `.dkc`, what
the reader is given to open it, and the exact error and step at which the full
reading flow (`capsule.Open`, §63) must fail.

```json
{
  "name": "version changed",
  "spec": true,
  "dkc": { "base": "time_only.dkc", "edits": [[4, 1, "04"]] },
  "release": { "round": 1000, "signature": "b446…" },
  "now": "2023-08-23T15:59:24Z",
  "registry": "default",
  "network": false,
  "frozen": false,
  "error": "ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION",
  "step": 2
}
```

- `name`: unique, stable.
- `spec`: true for the 169 mutations listed in spec §64, false for the further
  cases of the reference. The cases come in this order: the 33 mutations of
  the first two lists of §64 on the format 1 fixtures (cases 1 to 33), 32
  further cases (34 to 65), the same 33 mutations on the format 2 fixtures,
  named "format 2: …" (66 to 98), the 23 of the list of format 2 (99 to 121),
  5 further cases (122 to 126), the same 33 on the format 3 fixtures, named
  "format 3: …" (127 to 159), the 47 of the list of format 3 (160 to 206),
  and 3 further cases (207 to 209). A line of the lists of §64 with several
  values, such as "AREA_LEN 0, 511, 513 o 66048", is one case for each.
- `dkc`: the capsule, as edits of a fixture (see above). The reader gets it as a
  seekable file, so that the `capsule_digest` of an offered `.dkk` is checked
  before any release request (spec §63 step 9.a).
- `dkk`: the hex of a complete `.dkk` file (prelude and body) offered as the
  access credential; absent when none is offered.
- `identities`: age X25519 identities (`AGE-SECRET-KEY-1…`) offered as access
  credentials; absent when none.
- `release`: what the release source answers to every request, whatever round
  is asked for. The reader must verify it (§51): a case may serve a release of
  another round, a round with the signature of another, or a signature that is
  not the canonical encoding of a point (§12.2). `null` means that no release
  is available (`ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE`). The release is supplied directly,
  as the caller's own, so one that breaks the rules of step 10 gets the code
  of step 10; a source that fetched it over a network would have discarded
  it, and the code would be `ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE` at step 9 (spec §63
  steps 9 and 10).
- `now`: the reader's clock, RFC 3339. No release is requested before the round
  time of the DateKey.
- `registry`: `default` pins exactly the Quicknet profile of
  `profile_quicknet.json`; `empty` pins none.
- `extensions`: the extensions the application implements. Each entry is known
  at `(id, version)`, and its data is valid only when it equals the bytes of
  `valid_data`. Each entry is registered in both arrays of every object
  (§72), as a Go `extension.Registry` that does not implement
  `extension.Placement`: an extension outside its registration counts as
  unknown there (§54), so the cases "known critical PUBLIC_HEADER extension
  with invalid data", "known critical CONTROL_CBOR extension with invalid
  data" and "known critical .dkk extension with invalid data", at steps 4, 14
  and 9, depend on it. Absent: the application knows no extension, the state
  of the base protocol V1.
- `network`: whether the failure may come after a release request. When false,
  the reader must fail without requesting any release (§27, §63): every failure
  of steps 1 to 8 and of step 9 before the request (9.a to 9.c).
- `frozen`: the capsule was built once with age randomness; its bytes are kept
  and never regenerated. These cases have no `base`.
- `error`, `step`: the expected code and the step of §63 that fails. For a
  capsule that opens, `error` is `ok`, `step` is 0 and `verdicts` holds the
  verdicts of its security area, `signature` and `seal`, with the `lines`
  that show them (spec §29.7): the three cases of security of the list of
  format 3.

Every case reproduces offline: the recorded release stands in for the network.
A reader that implements only steps 1 to 8 can replay every case whose `step` is
at most 8: 57 cases, 39 of them from §64. Steps 1 to 8 are summarised in "The
checks of steps 1 to 8" below.

### Credentials and the release: step 9

What happens between step 8 and the release request is spec §63 step 9: for
`time_and_key` only, an offered `.dkk` is checked as an object and then bound
to the capsule (9.a), at least one credential must be offered (9.b), and for
either policy a `now` before the round time of the DateKey fails without a
request (9.c); only then is the release requested. For `time_only` the
credentials play no part: the §64 case "access_policy=time_only with
time_and_key structure" offers a `.dkk` whose `capsule_digest` is that of the
unmutated capsule, and fails at step 12, not at step 9. The codes after the
request, for the release (step 10) and for the identities that open each age
file (steps 11, 13 and 17), are those of spec §63 as well. In this corpus:

- identities are not examined before the release (spec §63 step 13);
- a `release` of `null` is `ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE` at step 9;
- every `release` is supplied directly, so an invalid one fails at step 10:
  the source is not a network source, which would discard it at step 9;
- every `.dkk` offered decodes: the corpus checks step 9.a, not the decoding
  of a `.dkk`, whose errors spec §63 also places at step 9.a.

### Point encodings: steps 10 and 11

Ten cases of §64, in each format, test the canonical point encoding of spec
§12.2 and the tlock stanza body `U || V || W` of spec §63 step 11:

- five edit the tlock stanza body of `time_only.dkc`: U with c0 + p, U the
  point at infinity (the byte 0xc0, then zeros), U with the infinity flag
  over its own coordinate bits, and bodies of 127 and 129 bytes. Each recomputes the header
  MAC of OUTER_TIME_AGE with FK_TIME, so the age header stays authentic and
  only the rules of step 11 reject the capsule (`ERR_INTEGRITY`); a reader
  whose decoder reduces coordinates modulo p opens the first one;
- three serve the release of `time_only.dkc` with its signature edited: the
  point at infinity, the infinity flag over its own coordinate bits, and the
  negated signature (the sort flag flipped: a canonical point that does not
  verify); a fourth serves the published signature of round 1004 re-encoded
  as x + p, over a frozen capsule for round 1004, because no fixture round
  has a signature whose x + p fits in 381 bits. All four fail at step 10
  (`ERR_RELEASE_INVALID`);
- the last one serves the negated signature with U with c0 + p: step 10
  comes first.

In format 2 the same ten edit `format2_time_only.dkc` and its release, and the
x + p case has a frozen format 2 capsule for round 1004.

### Format 2: its list of §64

The 23 cases of the list of format 2 of §64 test what format 2 adds:

- the format against the rest of the capsule, with another `VERSION`, a
  public byte (§22, §76): a format 1 `time_and_key` capsule of one stanza
  relabeled format 2 fails at step 12, and the other relabelings, format 2 as
  1 or 3 and format 1 as 2, at step 14, where the schema version of the
  control is not the format;
- the 16 stanzas of INNER_ACCESS_AGE: 15, 17, two for one recipient, and an
  identity that opens none of them, at steps 12 and 13;
- keys 6 and 7 of CONTROL_CBOR, at step 14;
- the plaintext of PAYLOAD_AGE, at step 17: a padding byte that is not zero,
  a plaintext of P − 1 or P + 256 bytes or without its padding, and a control
  that declares another code or another L.

Each derives from a fixture without randomness. What it changes is sealed again
with the file keys that the release and the credentials of the fixture open,
FK_TIME and FK_ACCESS, or that its I_PAYLOAD unwraps, FK_PAYLOAD, and with the
nonces of the fixture; a stanza it adds takes its ephemeral scalar from a fixed
seed. So each case is a `base` with edits, and regenerates byte for byte. A
case that changes a `time_and_key` capsule offers the identity of its `.dkk`,
because the `.dkk` itself would fail at step 9.a: its `capsule_digest` no
longer matches. Five further cases, 122 to 126, offer the `.dkk` and show
that.

### Format 3: its list of §64

The 47 cases of the list of format 3 of §64 test what format 3 adds, all at
step 17 but the first:

- `VERSION` 2 on a format 3 capsule, at step 14 (`VERSION` 4 is
  "format 3: version changed", as in format 2);
- the frame of BODY and the area (§29.2): each value of `AREA_LEN`,
  `SECURITY_LEN` and `HEAD_LEN` that §64 lists, a frame that does not fit in
  L, L < 12, a byte of the area that is not zero, all `ERR_INTEGRITY`;
- the head (§29.4 to §29.6): its version and type tag, a byte more within
  `HEAD_LEN`, R8 and R1 in layer 3, and in layer 4 the paths, the comment,
  the declared author, the layout and the tree, 65536 implicit folders
  included;
- the files: the end of the last file that is not C, and a byte of a file
  changed, `ERR_INTEGRITY`;
- the precedence of the end of step 17: a path `..` with a padding byte that
  is not zero is `ERR_HEAD_INVALID`, but with the next STREAM chunk corrupt,
  or with PAYLOAD_AGE cut right after the chunk that holds the head, it is
  `ERR_INTEGRITY`;
- three cases of security that open, without a code, with the verdicts X,
  F1 and S1.

They derive from `format3_single`, and the two that need a head followed by
another chunk from `format3_tree`. What a case changes in BODY is sealed again
with FK_PAYLOAD and the nonce of its fixture, followed by the zeros of the
padding up to the P of its L, and when L changes the control is sealed again
with the new L, as anyone can seal the control of a `time_only` capsule
(spec §36.1). The case of 65536 implicit folders carries a head of 235 KB,
2115 paths, all but the last of 32 segments; it is most of the size of the
file. The three
further cases relabel format 3 as 1, and a `time_and_key` capsule as 2 with
its identity and with its `.dkk`.

## The checks of steps 1 to 8

`mutations.json` and `inspect_differential.json` follow the rules of the
specification for steps 1 to 8, with the `default` registry (Quicknet pinned),
no extension known unless a case lists some, and no secret. The first failure
ends the flow, and within one object the first failing layer decides the code
(spec §69.1):

| Step | Rules | Spec |
|---|---|---|
| 1, 2 | magic, truncated prelude, `VERSION` 1, 2 or 3 (the format), FLAGS and RESERVED, `PUBLIC_HEADER_LEN` in 1 to 1048576 and `SEALED_CONTROL_LEN` in 1 to 67108864 | §22, §23 |
| 3 | the PUBLIC_HEADER bytes are present | §23 |
| 4 | PUBLIC_HEADER: layers 2 to 4, the `public_header` decoder of the schema vectors, then the pinned profile of the DateKey and the critical extensions; with no extension known, every `critical_extensions` array fails | §63, §69.1 |
| 5 | the SEALED_CONTROL bytes are present, then its age header, parsed within `SEALED_CONTROL_LEN` bytes: malformed is `ERR_INTEGRITY`, one tlock stanza is required | §28.1 |
| 6 | the age header of PAYLOAD_AGE, from its offset to the end of the file: malformed is `ERR_INTEGRITY`, one X25519 stanza is required | §22, §28.1 |
| 7 | the round time of the DateKey is at most 9999-12-31T23:59:59Z (Quicknet: round 83903165811 at most); a `dk1_` round above it passes step 4 and fails here | §15 |
| 8 | the tlock stanza has exactly two arguments, the canonical decimal round and the lowercase hex chain hash, compared as strings | §63 step 8 |

The reference parses age headers with `filippo.io/age` v1.3.2, whose parser
limits (1024 stanzas, 128 arguments after the type, 2 MiB) spec §74 lists as
implementation limits. No case of these corpora depends on them.

## `vectors/inspect_differential.json`

A differential corpus of the pre-unlock checks: 5110 deterministic mutations of
fourteen official `.dkc` fixtures, 365 of each, with the verdict of steps 1
to 8 of §63 as the reference computes it (`capsule.Inspect` with the `default`
registry, no extension known, no network, no secret), by the rules that "The
checks of steps 1 to 8" above points to. The first 1825, those of the five
format 1 fixtures, are the corpus of v0.8.2 unchanged; the seven format 2
fixtures follow, and then two of format 3, `format3_single` and
`format3_time_and_key_portable`, one for each policy: steps 1 to 8 see nothing
of format 3 that format 2 does not have, but `VERSION`. The `format` field of the file describes the layout below in
words; it is not a capsule format.

```json
{
  "seed": 20260925,
  "bases": [ { "file": "time_only.dkc", "sha256": "99e9…" } ],
  "mutations": [
    {"base":0,"kind":"flip","edits":[[121,1,"b3"]],"result":"ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR","step":4},
    {"base":0,"kind":"flip","edits":[[725,1,"4d"]],"result":"ok"}
  ]
}
```

- `bases`: the fixtures, with the SHA-256 of their exact bytes. `base` in a
  mutation is an index into this list.
- `edits`: see "Edited files".
- `result`: `ok` when steps 1 to 8 pass, or the error code; `step` is the step
  that failed, absent when `ok`.
- `kind` names the generator and is informative: `flip` (one bit), `byte` (one
  byte replaced), `truncate`, `insert` and `delete` (one to four bytes),
  `length` (PUBLIC_HEADER_LEN and SEALED_CONTROL_LEN), `header` (PUBLIC_HEADER
  re-encoded with one CBOR-aware change: a key removed, added or retyped, the
  type tag, version, `capsule_id`, DateKey or `access_policy` changed, an
  extension array added, a head not in its shortest form, keys out of order or
  repeated, the whole item tagged, wrapped, made indefinite, truncated or
  followed by bytes), `datekey` (the DateKey string alone), `age` (the age
  header of SEALED_CONTROL or PAYLOAD_AGE edited: intro line, stanza type,
  arguments, stanzas added or removed, body lines, MAC line, line endings).
  Most `header`, `datekey` and SEALED_CONTROL `age` mutations also rewrite the
  prelude lengths to match; some keep the old ones on purpose.
- `seed` seeds the generator of the reference and is informative too: every
  mutation is stored explicitly.

## `fixtures/<name>.inspect.json`

For each official `.dkc`, the exact bytes that `datekeys inspect -json -in
<name>.dkc` prints when run in `testdata/fixtures`: JSON indented with two
spaces, fields in this order, and a final newline. The pre-unlock checks use
the `default` registry.

| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| `file` | the `-in` argument, `<name>.dkc` |
| `format` | the capsule format, once step 2 has passed |
| `capsule_id` | hex, once step 4 has decoded the header |
| `datekey`, `profile`, `round` | the canonical `dk1_` string, its profile and round |
| `unlock_at` | the round time of the DateKey, RFC 3339 in UTC, once step 7 passes |
| `access_policy` | `time_only` or `time_and_key` |
| `valid` | true when steps 1 to 8 pass |
| `error` | the code of the failure, absent when valid |
| `checks` | one entry per step run: `step`, `name`, `ok`, `detail` (free text) and, for a failed step, `error` |

`detail` is informative text of the reference; a second implementation compares
at least `step`, `name`, `ok` and `error`, and every other field.

## Existing vectors and fixtures

- `vectors/profile_quicknet.json`: the Quicknet profile fields,
  `canonical_cbor` (hex) and `profile_hash`.
- `vectors/quicknet_rounds.json`: `vectors` of `requested` instants (RFC 3339
  with nanoseconds) and the resolved `round` and `effective` time, or `error`.
- `vectors/dk1.json`: valid `vectors` with `network`, `round`,
  `canonical_json`, `base64url` and `dk1`; invalid ones with `input` and the
  `error` code (`accepted` would mean the input decodes).
- `fixtures/<name>.json`: for each `.dkc`, its `format`, its SHA-256, the
  release that opens it, the hex of the prelude, PUBLIC_HEADER and
  CONTROL_CBOR, the DateKey, `capsule_id`, `header_binding`,
  `payload_identity` (I_PAYLOAD, a test secret), the visible stanzas of each
  age file, the identities or `.dkk` that open it, `payload_length` (L), the
  exact extension data, and the result of every step of §63. In format 2 it
  adds `padding` (the code) and `padded_length` (P) and, for `time_and_key`,
  `access_key_stanza` and `identity_stanzas`: the index, from 0, in
  `inner_stanzas` of the stanza that the `.dkk` and each identity of
  `identities`, in order, open. The other stanzas are dummies; the official
  vectors are the only place where that is recorded (spec §39). In format 3,
  as in format 2, with `payload_length` the length of BODY, it adds
  `area_len`, `security_cbor`, `head_cbor`, `salt`, `comment`,
  `declared_author`, `head_extensions`, `content_offset`, the offset of the
  files in BODY, 12 + `AREA_LEN` + `HEAD_LEN`, `files`, each with its `path`,
  `size`, `start`, `end`, `sha256` and `mtime` when it has one, its bytes
  being those of BODY from `content_offset + start` to `content_offset +
  end`, and `verdicts`, with `signature`, `seal` and the `lines` that show
  them.
- `fixtures/<name>.dkk.json`: for each `.dkk`, its SHA-256, `credential_id`,
  `capsule_id`, `access_type`, `access_material` (a test secret),
  `capsule_digest`, extensions and the capsule it opens.