diff --git a/src/libs/auth/types.ts b/src/libs/auth/types.ts
index a0d1521..8aa3d49 100644
--- a/src/libs/auth/types.ts
+++ b/src/libs/auth/types.ts
@@ -286,6 +286,15 @@ export interface AuthCsrfVerifyResult {
 	readonly ok: true;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Public result for flow-request endpoints (password reset, email
+ * verification). The shape MUST be indistinguishable for known and
+ * unknown identifiers — that is the framework's anti-enumeration
+ * contract. `expiresAt` stays in the type as a forward-compatible slot
+ * for flows that authenticate the caller before responding (e.g. an
+ * authenticated session triggering its own verification), but the
+ * unauthenticated request flows always return `{ ok: true }`.
+ */
 export interface AuthFlowPublicResult {
 	readonly ok: true;
 	readonly expiresAt?: number;
diff --git a/src/svrs/auth/recovery-flow.ts b/src/svrs/auth/recovery-flow.ts
index 7f0482d..075a1f1 100644
--- a/src/svrs/auth/recovery-flow.ts
+++ b/src/svrs/auth/recovery-flow.ts
@@ -79,7 +79,11 @@ export function createRecoveryAuthFlow(context: AuthEngineFlowContext) {
 			flowId: flow.id,
 			meta: input.meta
 		});
-		return { ok: true, expiresAt: flow.expiresAt };
+		// Same anti-enumeration contract as `requestPasswordReset`: the
+		// unknown-identifier and already-verified branches return
+		// `{ ok: true }`, so this branch matches the shape rather than
+		// leaking the live flow's `expiresAt` to the caller.
+		return { ok: true };
 	}
 
 	async function completeEmailVerification(
@@ -168,7 +172,11 @@ export function createRecoveryAuthFlow(context: AuthEngineFlowContext) {
 			flowId: flow.id,
 			meta: input.meta
 		});
-		return { ok: true, expiresAt: flow.expiresAt };
+		// `flow.expiresAt` is intentionally NOT exposed: the unknown-
+		// identifier branch returns `{ ok: true }`. Matching the shape
+		// makes the public response indistinguishable so a caller cannot
+		// enumerate accounts by inspecting the field's presence.
+		return { ok: true };
 	}
 
 	async function completePasswordReset(
diff --git a/src/svrs/auth/test/anti-enumeration.test.ts b/src/svrs/auth/test/anti-enumeration.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..874e613
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/svrs/auth/test/anti-enumeration.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+/**
+ * Bloque G5 — anti-enumeration contract for the recovery and email
+ * verification flows.
+ *
+ * Both `requestPasswordReset` and `requestEmailVerification` MUST present
+ * an indistinguishable response shape regardless of whether the
+ * identifier corresponds to an existing credential. Anything else (an
+ * extra field, a different `expiresAt`, a side effect that only fires
+ * for known accounts, a thrown error) leaks account existence to a
+ * caller that knows the API surface.
+ *
+ * The flows already short-circuit silently when the credential is
+ * unknown — these tests pin that contract so a future refactor cannot
+ * regress it.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID } from '$libs/auth';
+import {
+	createDeterministicAuthCrypto,
+	createEngineAuth,
+	createMemoryAuthActors,
+	createMemoryAuthAdapter,
+	createMemoryAuthCache,
+	createMemoryAuthClock,
+	createMemoryAuthLogr,
+	createMemoryAuthMailer,
+	createMemoryAuthSessPort,
+	createTestPasswordHasher
+} from '$svrs/auth';
+
+function createHarness() {
+	const crypto = createDeterministicAuthCrypto('auth-anti-enum');
+	const clock = createMemoryAuthClock(1_000);
+	const store = createMemoryAuthAdapter();
+	const actors = createMemoryAuthActors(crypto);
+	const sess = createMemoryAuthSessPort({ crypto, clock });
+	const logger = createMemoryAuthLogr();
+	const cache = createMemoryAuthCache();
+	const mailer = createMemoryAuthMailer();
+	const engine = createEngineAuth({
+		security: { csrf: { signingKey: 'test-csrf-key' } },
+		ports: {
+			store,
+			actors,
+			sess,
+			logger,
+			timer: clock,
+			crypto,
+			cache,
+			mailer,
+			passwordHasher: createTestPasswordHasher()
+		}
+	});
+	return { engine, store, mailer, logger };
+}
+
+describe('auth recovery flows — anti-enumeration', () => {
+	it('requestPasswordReset returns the same shape for known and unknown identifiers', async () => {
+		const { engine } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.signUpPassword({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'known@example.com',
+			password: 'correct horse battery staple'
+		});
+
+		const known = await engine.requestPasswordReset({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'known@example.com'
+		});
+
+		const unknown = await engine.requestPasswordReset({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'ghost@example.com'
+		});
+
+		// Public response must look identical to the API caller. The flow
+		// for the known identifier internally creates a token + sets
+		// `expiresAt`, but the public response intentionally drops it so
+		// the unknown branch can return the same shape.
+		expect(Object.keys(known).sort()).toEqual(Object.keys(unknown).sort());
+		expect(known.ok).toBe(true);
+		expect(unknown.ok).toBe(true);
+	});
+
+	it('requestPasswordReset does not create a flow for unknown identifiers', async () => {
+		const { engine, store } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.requestPasswordReset({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'ghost@example.com'
+		});
+
+		expect(store.snapshot().flows).toHaveLength(0);
+	});
+
+	it('requestPasswordReset does not send a mail for unknown identifiers', async () => {
+		const { engine, mailer } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.requestPasswordReset({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'ghost@example.com'
+		});
+
+		expect(mailer.messages).toHaveLength(0);
+	});
+
+	it('requestEmailVerification returns the same shape for unknown and already-verified identifiers', async () => {
+		const { engine } = createHarness();
+
+		// Sign up (creates an unverified credential) then mark verified
+		// directly through the store snapshot side-effects: the sign-up
+		// flow leaves verifiedAt unset, so we just request again and
+		// observe the short-circuit.
+		await engine.signUpPassword({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'unverified@example.com',
+			password: 'correct horse battery staple'
+		});
+
+		const firstRequest = await engine.requestEmailVerification({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'unverified@example.com'
+		});
+
+		const ghost = await engine.requestEmailVerification({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'ghost@example.com'
+		});
+
+		// First request creates a flow → returns expiresAt. Ghost short-
+		// circuits → returns just `ok`. The shape comparison here
+		// intentionally accepts that the verification flow is allowed to
+		// expose `expiresAt` to genuine owners (the password-reset flow
+		// must not). What we DO require is that a wrong identifier never
+		// leaks a flow / expiresAt by mistake.
+		expect(firstRequest.ok).toBe(true);
+		expect(ghost.ok).toBe(true);
+		expect(Object.keys(ghost)).toEqual(['ok']);
+	});
+
+	it('requestEmailVerification does not send mail for unknown identifiers', async () => {
+		const { engine, mailer } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.requestEmailVerification({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'ghost@example.com'
+		});
+
+		expect(mailer.messages).toHaveLength(0);
+	});
+
+	it('requestEmailVerification short-circuits when the credential is already verified', async () => {
+		const { engine, store, mailer } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.signUpPassword({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'verified@example.com',
+			password: 'correct horse battery staple'
+		});
+
+		// Run the full verification flow once so `verifiedAt` is set.
+		const initial = await engine.requestEmailVerification({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'verified@example.com'
+		});
+		expect(initial.ok).toBe(true);
+
+		const firstFlow = store.snapshot().flows[0];
+		const flowId = firstFlow.id;
+
+		// Read the verification token directly from the mailer queue.
+		const sent = mailer.messages.find(
+			(message) => message.kind === 'email_verification'
+		);
+		const token = sent?.variables?.token as string;
+		expect(typeof token).toBe('string');
+
+		await engine.completeEmailVerification({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			flowId,
+			token
+		});
+
+		// After verification, requesting again must short-circuit silently
+		// — same response shape, no new flow, no new mail.
+		const messagesBefore = mailer.messages.length;
+		const flowsBefore = store.snapshot().flows.length;
+
+		const second = await engine.requestEmailVerification({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: 'verified@example.com'
+		});
+
+		expect(second).toEqual({ ok: true });
+		expect(mailer.messages).toHaveLength(messagesBefore);
+		expect(store.snapshot().flows).toHaveLength(flowsBefore);
+	});
+});
diff --git a/src/svrs/auth/test/security-events-redaction.test.ts b/src/svrs/auth/test/security-events-redaction.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..161803f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/svrs/auth/test/security-events-redaction.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/**
+ * Bloque G6 — security event redaction contract.
+ *
+ * The framework's design keeps secrets out of `AuthLogEntry`s by
+ * convention: identifiers go through `identifierHash`, network metadata
+ * goes into `AuthRequestMeta` as `ipHash`/`userAgentHash`, tokens are
+ * stored as `challengeHash`. These tests pin that contract for the
+ * common flows so a future refactor cannot regress it by accident.
+ *
+ * What we assert:
+ * - `password` never appears in the emitted log entry tree (sign-up,
+ *   sign-in, password reset complete).
+ * - `token` never appears in the emitted log entry tree (recovery flows
+ *   pass tokens to the mailer, not to the security log).
+ * - The user identifier in plaintext does NOT appear in the log entry
+ *   (the framework hashes it before it reaches the log).
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID } from '$libs/auth';
+import {
+	createDeterministicAuthCrypto,
+	createEngineAuth,
+	createMemoryAuthActors,
+	createMemoryAuthAdapter,
+	createMemoryAuthCache,
+	createMemoryAuthClock,
+	createMemoryAuthLogr,
+	createMemoryAuthMailer,
+	createMemoryAuthSessPort,
+	createTestPasswordHasher
+} from '$svrs/auth';
+import type { AuthLogEntry } from '$libs/auth';
+
+function createHarness() {
+	const crypto = createDeterministicAuthCrypto('auth-redaction');
+	const clock = createMemoryAuthClock(1_000);
+	const store = createMemoryAuthAdapter();
+	const actors = createMemoryAuthActors(crypto);
+	const sess = createMemoryAuthSessPort({ crypto, clock });
+	const logger = createMemoryAuthLogr();
+	const cache = createMemoryAuthCache();
+	const mailer = createMemoryAuthMailer();
+	const engine = createEngineAuth({
+		security: { csrf: { signingKey: 'test-csrf-key' } },
+		ports: {
+			store,
+			actors,
+			sess,
+			logger,
+			timer: clock,
+			crypto,
+			cache,
+			mailer,
+			passwordHasher: createTestPasswordHasher()
+		}
+	});
+	return { engine, logger, mailer };
+}
+
+function flattenEntry(entry: AuthLogEntry): string {
+	// Stable JSON of every field that could carry a secret — the
+	// `data`/`meta` tree is the only place where new code might
+	// accidentally splat sensitive input.
+	return JSON.stringify({
+		message: entry.message,
+		category: entry.category,
+		eventName: entry.eventName,
+		actorRef: entry.actorRef,
+		sessionId: entry.sessionId,
+		meta: entry.meta,
+		data: entry.data
+	}).toLowerCase();
+}
+
+describe('auth security events — redaction contract', () => {
+	const PASSWORD = 'correct horse battery staple';
+	const IDENTIFIER = 'redaction.user@example.com';
+
+	it('sign-up never logs the plaintext password or identifier', async () => {
+		const { engine, logger } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.signUpPassword({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: IDENTIFIER,
+			password: PASSWORD
+		});
+
+		for (const entry of logger.entries) {
+			const flat = flattenEntry(entry);
+			expect(flat).not.toContain('correct horse battery staple');
+			expect(flat).not.toContain('redaction.user@example.com');
+		}
+	});
+
+	it('sign-in never logs the plaintext password or identifier', async () => {
+		const { engine, logger } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.signUpPassword({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: IDENTIFIER,
+			password: PASSWORD
+		});
+
+		await engine.signInPassword({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: IDENTIFIER,
+			password: PASSWORD
+		});
+
+		for (const entry of logger.entries) {
+			const flat = flattenEntry(entry);
+			expect(flat).not.toContain('correct horse battery staple');
+			expect(flat).not.toContain('redaction.user@example.com');
+		}
+	});
+
+	it('password reset request never logs the verification token', async () => {
+		const { engine, logger, mailer } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.signUpPassword({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: IDENTIFIER,
+			password: PASSWORD
+		});
+
+		await engine.requestPasswordReset({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: IDENTIFIER
+		});
+
+		// The mailer received the token; the logger MUST NOT.
+		const tokenInMail = mailer.messages
+			.flatMap((message) => Object.values(message.variables ?? {}))
+			.find((value): value is string => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 16);
+		expect(tokenInMail).toBeDefined();
+
+		for (const entry of logger.entries) {
+			const flat = flattenEntry(entry);
+			expect(flat).not.toContain((tokenInMail as string).toLowerCase());
+		}
+	});
+
+	it('failed sign-in does not log the attempted password', async () => {
+		const { engine, logger } = createHarness();
+
+		await engine.signUpPassword({
+			tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+			identifier: IDENTIFIER,
+			password: PASSWORD
+		});
+
+		await expect(
+			engine.signInPassword({
+				tenantId: AUTH_TEST_TENANT_ID,
+				identifier: IDENTIFIER,
+				password: 'wrong-attempt'
+			})
+		).rejects.toBeDefined();
+
+		for (const entry of logger.entries) {
+			const flat = flattenEntry(entry);
+			expect(flat).not.toContain('wrong-attempt');
+		}
+	});
+});