# Changelog

All notable changes to this module are documented here. The project follows
semantic versioning; `v0.x` versions make no API stability promise.

## Unreleased — specification v0.8.2

Moves the module to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.8.2, whose one
normative change closes the extension format (spec §76). Framing and schema
versions do not change.

### Breaking changes

- `extension.New(id, version, data []byte)` takes the opaque data bytes instead
  of a value that it encoded as CBOR, and rejects nil or empty data. An
  extension without data is the literal `extension.Extension{ID, Version}`,
  which omits key 2.
- Extension data (key 2) must be a byte string of at least one byte. Any other
  CBOR type, `null` or `h''` at key 2 is now `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`, so a
  v0.8.1 object with such data no longer decodes. The base protocol never
  decodes the content (§54).
- `extension.Wire.Data` is `[]byte`, the content of the byte string, instead of
  `cbor.RawMessage`.
- `codec.Valid` is removed: nothing decodes extension data any more.
  `codec.FuzzValid` is replaced by `codec.FuzzUnmarshal`.
- At most 64 extensions per array and `extension_version` at most 2^32−1, on
  encode and decode (`ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`). An `extension_id` appears at
  most once per object, and arrays are ordered by `extension_id` only.
- Provider Profile: `genesis_time` is an unsigned integer, and `period` and
  `genesis_time` are at most 2^53−1; a negative or larger value is
  `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`.
- `null` in a byte-string field is `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR` (for example a
  `null` `access_material` was `ERR_ACCESS_INVALID`): nil byte strings, arrays
  and maps now encode as empty ones, never as `null`.
- `capsule.EncodeHeader` and `capsule.DecodeHeader` enforce the 1 MiB
  PUBLIC_HEADER limit and `accesskey.DecodeBody` the 16 MiB BODY limit. Every
  frame-limit refusal, including those of `accesskey.MarshalBody` and of
  `capsule.Encrypt` for SEALED_CONTROL, now wraps `ERR_INTEGRITY` (§57).
- `profile.Profile.CanonicalCBOR` refuses a `period` or `genesis_time` outside
  the schema with `ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR`, as `profile.Decode` does.
- The official fixture `time_only_extensions` is regenerated: its header data
  is the raw UTF-8 bytes of "public label" and its control data is
  `{0: 7, 1: "sealed"}` (`a2000701667365616c6564`). Every other `.dkc` and
  `.dkk` keeps its bytes; the fixture and vector metadata name spec 0.8.2.

### Added

- `ErrExtensionDataInvalid` (`ERR_EXTENSION_DATA_INVALID`, §69).
- `extension.DataValidator`, an optional interface of a `Registry` that
  validates the data of the extensions it knows: a known critical extension
  with invalid data fails with `ErrExtensionDataInvalid` (§63 steps 4 and 14,
  and the `.dkk` check); a known noncritical one is reported in
  `capsule.Inspection.UnusableExtensions`, `capsule.Opened.UnusableControlExtensions`
  or `capsule.Opened.UnusableAccessKeyExtensions` (`extension.CheckNoncritical`,
  `extension.Unusable`) and does not fail.
- Encoder self-checks: `capsule.Encrypt` decodes its PUBLIC_HEADER and
  CONTROL_CBOR, and `accesskey.MarshalBody` its body, with the readers'
  decoders before sealing or writing (§72).
- `extension.MaxExtensions`, `MaxVersion`, `MaxDataLen` and `codec.MaxSafeUint`.
- The `.dkk` fixture `time_and_key_portable_extension`, which carries a
  noncritical extension with data (§68).
- `genfixtures -only NAME[,NAME...]` regenerates the named fixtures only.
- Tests: the three new §64 mutations (data that is not a byte string, `h''`
  data, 65 extensions), regression tests for the cases of §76, conformance
  checks on the exact data bytes, and the fuzz target
  `capsule.FuzzEncodeImpliesDecode` (header, control and `.dkk`).

### Fixed

- `extension.CheckDisjoint` is a linear merge of the two sorted arrays; a
  PUBLIC_HEADER with 40 000 + 40 000 extensions took 8.3 s in the pairwise
  check (§76, case 6).
- Control data made of 14 or 15 nested arrays was sealed by `Encrypt` and
  rejected by `Open` at step 14, after the unlock (§76, case 5).
- Header data `{NaN: 0, NaN: 1}` gave a nondeterministic verdict (§76, case 3).
- `extension.New(id, v, nil)` wrote `null` as data (§76, case 2).
- `codec.Unmarshal` wipes its re-encoding, which after the new self-checks
  held a copy of I_PAYLOAD or `access_material`, and `accesskey.DecodeBody`
  wipes the material on its error paths.

## Unreleased — v0.1.0

First implementation of the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.8.1.

### Added

- `datekey`: local date → round resolution at full precision (§15), canonical
  `dk1_` encoding and strict parsing (§18, §19).
- `profile`: Provider Profile Deterministic CBOR and `profile_hash` (§11), the
  pinned Quicknet profile with its chain-hash self-check (§12), and pinned
  registries (§13).
- `provider`: release sources and local BLS verification (§51);
  `provider/drand`: racing public relays, verifying every answer (§48, §49, §52).
- `codec`: Deterministic CBOR with a re-encoding canonicality check (§58, §58.1).
- `extension`: the generic extension mechanism (§54).
- `agewrap`: strict tlock and X25519 age identities that enforce the stanza
  rules (§27, §29, §32, §33, §35), and a secret-free header probe.
- `capsule`: `.dkc` framing, `Encrypt` for `time_only` and `time_and_key`
  (§61, §62), `Inspect` (§63 steps 1–8) and `Open` (§63 steps 9–18).
- `accesskey`: `.dkk` encoding and decoding (§40–§44).
- `cmd/datekeys`: `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `inspect`, `datekey resolve`,
  `profile hash`, with atomic, non-overwriting outputs.
- Official vectors (§65, §66), `.dkc`/`.dkk` fixtures (§67, §68), the mutation
  corpus (§64), fuzz targets for every parser, interoperability tests with the
  official `age` and `tle` CLIs, and live Quicknet integration tests.
- `spec/datekeys.cddl` and `docs/traceability.md`.