DateKeys

Commit Graph

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
dev	6c78c9401f	Test data: the mutations of a signature of alg 1 and of the public note The review found that the cases that spec 64 lists for the signature of alg 1, the area and the public note were tested in Go and not exported to testdata, where a second implementation reads them (D3). mutations.json adds eight, from format3_signed, format3_unsigned and a new format3_note: - the signature altered (F2), removed (F0), made again with another key (F4 of that key) and transplanted to another capsule (F2); - a key of 31 bytes and a signature of 65 (F1); - the area widened to 64 KiB after signing (F4, the same AUTHOR_MESSAGE); - the public note changed in PUBLIC_HEADER (ERR_HEADER_BINDING, step 15). The frozen cases of the corpus do not change. The records of the fixtures give the extensions of the header as it is written, the note included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	c3175a150a	Signature plan, steps 3 and 4: EncryptFiles signs and Open checks, alg 1 AreaLen is 32 KiB, and LargeArea asks for 64 KiB. EncryptOptions.AuthorKey signs inside sealer.write, through a prepare hook that gets the final control: SECURITY_CBOR and the frame are built and evaluated with the rules of the reader before anything is written. OpenOptions.AuthorKeys feeds EvaluateSecurityIn from openBody with control_commit, head_digest and the round time: F4, F3 with a saved key, F2 when it does not verify. The fixtures of v0.10 keep the area of 512 (AreaUnit). The two "unsupported" fixtures use alg 4294967295, since a random alg 1 is now F2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	18eb3c3f48	Format 3, step 6d: the mutations of format 3 The mutation corpus of spec 64 gains format 3: 209 cases, 169 of the spec. - The 33 mutations of the first two lists on format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, named "format 3: ...", with a sibling written by EncryptFiles and built capsules that hold a BODY. - The list of format 3, 47 cases: one for each value of a line with several (AREA_LEN 0, 511, 513 and 66048; SECURITY_LEN 0 and 513; HEAD_LEN 0 and 2^24 + 1), and the three that open without a code, with the verdicts X, F1 and S1. VERSION 4 is "format 3: version changed", as in format 2. Each seals BODY again with FK_PAYLOAD and the nonce of its fixture, and the control with the new L when L changes; the two that need a head followed by another STREAM chunk derive from format3_tree, whose comment takes the bytes the path loses so that only the head and its chunk change. - Further cases: format 3 relabeled 1, and time_and_key relabeled 2 with the identity and with the .dkk. - A mutation may expect the capsule to open with its verdicts; the exported case records them, with the result ok at step 0. - Splice gives an edit for each run of changed bytes, runs closer than 16 bytes merged, and one more for what one side has beyond the other: a head sealed again changes its bytes and the tag of its chunk, 64 KiB apart. Earlier cases are written with more edits and give the same capsules. The corpus is 706 KB, 476 KB of them the capsule of 65536 implicit folders, whose head is 235 KB. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	8955c0f650	Format 3, step 4: the writer EncryptFiles writes format 3 (spec 29.2 to 29.6, 61, 62, 62.1): the files of a list of Sources, each read twice, with the comment and the declared author. - Before anything is written: the paths and the texts are checked with the rules of the reader, in the words of a writer, naming the rule and the character, and the two paths of an R7 collision (rule 15); the comment has its CR LF and lone CR turned into LF (29.6); L is measured with a head whose salt and SHA-256 are zero, as long as the final one, and the first reading hashes each file, which must have exactly its Size. - The files go in the byte order of their paths (R8), whatever the order of the Sources; the mtime is kept only from 1970 to 9999, never clipped (rule 16); at least one file or a comment (rule 14). - The head, with a fresh salt, the control and the security area are decoded with the rules of the reader before sealing (rule 17), and the frame is checked against L. The area is 512 bytes with the empty security, whatever the options (rule 13). - The second reading writes each file into PAYLOAD_AGE and fails if its size or SHA-256 changed (rule 18). - Encrypt and EncryptFiles share the sealing; Encrypt writes format 2 only with the new TestVectors option (rule 1), and takes no head. The test data generators set it, and so does the CLI until step 5 moves it to EncryptFiles. - Result.Head is the head written. DecodeHead keeps the check of the critical extensions apart, so that the self-check decodes the head as the one of the control does. - The examples and the live test write with EncryptFiles. - The reader tests had a literal U+202E, now escaped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	7249ef4cd1	Format 3, step 3: the reader Open reads format 3 (spec 29.2 to 29.7, 63 steps 17 and 18): the PRELUDE accepts VERSION 3, and the files go to a Sink. - Sink: Begin with the validated head, Create for each file in the order of the head, and Commit only after every check of step 17; after any failure that follows a successful Begin, Abort, once. A format 3 capsule without a Sink fails right after step 2 with ErrSinkRequired, a caller error with no code, no failed step and no request; a capsule of format 1 or 2 without dst fails there too. - Step 17 in its substeps: the frame and the area, security and its verdicts, which never fail, the head, the files filling CONTENT, the SHA-256 of each file and the padding. A failure of age or a plaintext whose length is not P prevails; otherwise the first substep that fails decides, and a code other than ERR_INTEGRITY is reported only after reading PAYLOAD_AGE to its end. - The reads of BODY grow with the bytes received, never with AREA_LEN, HEAD_LEN or a declared size (spec 57); a test measures it. - A failure of the Sink is the caller's own error with ERR_INTEGRITY, as one of dst is in formats 1 and 2. - Opened gains Head, Verdicts, AreaLen and UnusableHeadExtensions. - Test data: "version changed" sets VERSION 4, and the format 2 list gains "format 2 time_only relabeled format 3", which fails at step 14, as section 64 of spec v0.10 lists: 126 cases, 89 of the spec. The randomly built capsules keep their recorded bytes. - testkit: Build writes format 3 and can edit the padded plaintext; Head3, Body3, DiscardSink and MemorySink build and open BODY. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	f24a280c28	Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	f6f2e9f55f	Spec v0.8.2 amendment: canonical point encoding; no library error text Amendment of the unreleased v0.8.2, recorded in §76 with its case: the second implementation's phase-2 research found that tlock-js over @noble/curves 1.9.7 accepts U re-encoded as c0 + p and a signature x + p and returns the same file key, while the reference rejects both (noble 1.9.7 differed from kilic on 5,615 of 41,686 encodings), and the spec did not say which encodings are valid. - §12.2 defines the canonical encoding of a BLS12-381 point (drand's compressed ZCash form) and requires decoders to reject every other byte string; §12.1 applies it to public_key. - §63 step 10 applies it to the release signature (ERR_RELEASE_INVALID) and step 11 defines the tlock stanza body U \|\| V \|\| W (96 + 16 + 16 bytes for Quicknet) with a canonical, non-infinity U (ERR_INTEGRITY). - §64 gains ten mutations, exported to mutations.json (65 cases). The signature x + p case uses published Quicknet round 1004, the first after 1000 whose x allows x + p < 2^381. The reference already gave every stated code and step. Errors no longer copy text from tlock, kyber, age, drand or kyber-bls12381. kyber's IBE error carried the candidate plaintext and r, and with one bit of W flipped the message disclosed the real tlock file key with that bit flipped. Every such place now uses a fixed reason with its normative sentinel; TestTlockFailureDiagnosticsCarryNoSecrets fails with the old wrapping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 weeks ago
dev	9cbcab10b2	Hand-written CBOR codec and shared test vectors (plan steps 2b and 3) Step 2b: package codec is rewritten without reflection or struct tags. A strict Decoder accepts only the spec §58 profile, Unmarshal decodes, re-encodes and compares, Peek reads the type tag and version, and Walk is a bounded iterative helper for vectors and fuzzing. Every schema has its own hand-written encoder and decoder that checks all CDDL rules before the fields with their own error codes. github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2 and github.com/x448/float16 are gone; nothing replaces them. Valid objects encode and decode exactly as before (1.34 million differential verdicts); the invalid-input differences are documented in CHANGELOG and traceability decision 12. A review found and fixed an access_policy check that truncated to uint8. Step 3: testdata gains vectors/cbor.json (generic and per-schema CBOR vectors), vectors/mutations.json (the 55-case mutation corpus, replayable offline), vectors/inspect_differential.json (1,825 fixed-seed mutations with the Go verdict) and one inspect -json golden per fixture, all regenerated byte-identically by genfixtures and documented in testdata/README.md for second implementations. Gate green with 90 s of fuzzing per target on all 15 targets; codec at 100 % coverage; pre-existing testdata byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 weeks ago

8 Commits (fe405e2348744f50e54c72e35ae10470a01dc552)