The draft v0.12 fixes what the review of the implementation of v0.11
found, without changing any format: the names of certificates in the
verdicts, the seal of each signer in the lines of F6 with the warning that
nobody checks who issued it, the holder by givenName and surname before
the commonName that carries the NIF, a profile of the certificate field by
field, identifiers by their bytes, repeated elements of a SET OF, the
edge cases of the token, the addresses and the padding of the locator, and
the errata of 44.1, 55.2, 64, 67 and 76. Section 76 lists each change with
its case. The CDDL fixes the sizes of the locator.
The reader shows the names of certificates between quotes, refuses one of
more than 64 code points or with two spaces in a row, names the authority
of each seal of F6 and adds the warning when a line says before the date,
and writes the result of a foreign signer in Spanish. The records of
format3_signed_cms and format3_sealed follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The author approved the text and the six open decisions on 1 October 2026.
The spec says now what the review left open: the form of the CMS signature
and of the TSTInfo field by field, the ESSCertIDv2 with SHA-256 written, the
padding of the locator at its boundaries, base32 CIDs, the addresses read
without decoding, the issuer shown by the rules of the holder, and the area
decided after the signatures. SpecVersion is 0.11, the records of fixtures
and vectors say so, and decrypt shows an mtime later than a valid seal as an
inconsistency, which 29.7 asks as a SHOULD.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The reader evaluates a signature of alg 2 (F1, F2, F5, F6, with the signers
named) and a seal of seal_type 2 (S1 to S5) in the context of the capsule,
with SIGNERS in strictly ascending order of certificate hashes. The writer
takes a CMSSigner, which gets AUTHOR_MESSAGE and returns what the person
signed outside, and a Sealer, which asks an authority for the token over
SEAL_SUBJECT; it checks the result with the rules of the reader and writes
nothing unless every required signer is valid and sealed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AreaLen is 32 KiB, and LargeArea asks for 64 KiB. EncryptOptions.AuthorKey
signs inside sealer.write, through a prepare hook that gets the final
control: SECURITY_CBOR and the frame are built and evaluated with the rules
of the reader before anything is written. OpenOptions.AuthorKeys feeds
EvaluateSecurityIn from openBody with control_commit, head_digest and the
round time: F4, F3 with a saved key, F2 when it does not verify.
The fixtures of v0.10 keep the area of 512 (AreaUnit). The two
"unsupported" fixtures use alg 4294967295, since a random alg 1 is now F2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
capsule/signature.go has what an author signs and a seal seals, as the
spec v0.11 draft defines it (29.8, 29.11): payload_commit, control_commit
over CONTROL_SIG, without I_PAYLOAD and with L at zero, head_digest,
signers_digest, AUTHOR_MESSAGE as ASCII text of 99 bytes with its code,
SIG_PART over the exact content of key 2, and SEAL_SUBJECT.
EvaluateSecurityIn checks a signature of alg 1 with the strict profile in
the context of a capsule: F4, or F3 with a key the person saved; F2 when
it does not verify; F1 without context, as in v0.10, and for alg 2, not
yet implemented. Verdicts carries the key and the label for the texts.
Not wired yet: the writer does not sign and still writes the area of 512
bytes, and the reader still calls EvaluateSecurity without context. The
handoff of docs lists what is left.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
EncryptFiles writes format 3 (spec 29.2 to 29.6, 61, 62, 62.1): the
files of a list of Sources, each read twice, with the comment and the
declared author.
- Before anything is written: the paths and the texts are checked with
the rules of the reader, in the words of a writer, naming the rule
and the character, and the two paths of an R7 collision (rule 15);
the comment has its CR LF and lone CR turned into LF (29.6); L is
measured with a head whose salt and SHA-256 are zero, as long as the
final one, and the first reading hashes each file, which must have
exactly its Size.
- The files go in the byte order of their paths (R8), whatever the
order of the Sources; the mtime is kept only from 1970 to 9999,
never clipped (rule 16); at least one file or a comment (rule 14).
- The head, with a fresh salt, the control and the security area are
decoded with the rules of the reader before sealing (rule 17), and
the frame is checked against L. The area is 512 bytes with the
empty security, whatever the options (rule 13).
- The second reading writes each file into PAYLOAD_AGE and fails if its
size or SHA-256 changed (rule 18).
- Encrypt and EncryptFiles share the sealing; Encrypt writes format 2
only with the new TestVectors option (rule 1), and takes no head.
The test data generators set it, and so does the CLI until step 5
moves it to EncryptFiles.
- Result.Head is the head written. DecodeHead keeps the check of the
critical extensions apart, so that the self-check decodes the head
as the one of the control does.
- The examples and the live test write with EncryptFiles.
- The reader tests had a literal U+202E, now escaped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Format3 and the control of schema version 3, with the keys of
version 2 (spec 31). The PRELUDE still rejects VERSION 3 until the
reader opens format 3, in step 3, with the test data that expect it.
- The frame of BODY (spec 29.2): AREA_LEN, SECURITY_LEN and HEAD_LEN,
their limits against L and the zeros of the area, all ERR_INTEGRITY.
- security (spec 29.3, 29.7): the outer map, with the signature and
the seal as separately encoded byte strings, and its verdicts X, F0,
F1, S0, S1 and S2, which never fail. The first row that holds
decides, so a seal that breaks its schema is S2 before its type is
read. Writers of this version write it empty, 22 bytes.
- The head (spec 29.4): layer 2 with its type tag and version 1;
layer 3 with the CDDL, R1 and R8; layer 4 in key order, the comment
and the declared author, each file with R2 to R6c, R10 and its
layout, R7 and R9 over the tree, all ERR_HEAD_INVALID, and then the
critical extensions of the new extension.Head object.
- ERR_HEAD_INVALID is declared; All lists it once SpecVersion moves to
0.10 with the test data, in step 6.
- The control tests take format 4 as the caller error that format 3
was, as section 76 of the spec anticipated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dev