7 Commits (a0de80fd85aa38f914e7008e5e3b133a4d86d23e)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
dev	7249ef4cd1	Format 3, step 3: the reader ... Open reads format 3 (spec 29.2 to 29.7, 63 steps 17 and 18): the PRELUDE accepts VERSION 3, and the files go to a Sink. - Sink: Begin with the validated head, Create for each file in the order of the head, and Commit only after every check of step 17; after any failure that follows a successful Begin, Abort, once. A format 3 capsule without a Sink fails right after step 2 with ErrSinkRequired, a caller error with no code, no failed step and no request; a capsule of format 1 or 2 without dst fails there too. - Step 17 in its substeps: the frame and the area, security and its verdicts, which never fail, the head, the files filling CONTENT, the SHA-256 of each file and the padding. A failure of age or a plaintext whose length is not P prevails; otherwise the first substep that fails decides, and a code other than ERR_INTEGRITY is reported only after reading PAYLOAD_AGE to its end. - The reads of BODY grow with the bytes received, never with AREA_LEN, HEAD_LEN or a declared size (spec 57); a test measures it. - A failure of the Sink is the caller's own error with ERR_INTEGRITY, as one of dst is in formats 1 and 2. - Opened gains Head, Verdicts, AreaLen and UnusableHeadExtensions. - Test data: "version changed" sets VERSION 4, and the format 2 list gains "format 2 time_only relabeled format 3", which fails at step 14, as section 64 of spec v0.10 lists: 126 cases, 89 of the spec. The randomly built capsules keep their recorded bytes. - testkit: Build writes format 3 and can edit the padded plaintext; Head3, Body3, DiscardSink and MemorySink build and open BODY. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	f24a280c28	Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 ... The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	9ac9cd952f	Spec v0.8.2: second-round corrections from the formal review ... The second round of the formal review confirmed the nine corrections of c57ed48 and asked for these, recorded in §76 as corrections 4 to 6 and an editorial note: - §72: an encoder MUST NOT write a registered extension in an object or array it is not registered for; §54: a reader MUST NOT interpret the data of a noncritical one it ignores for that reason. capsule.Encrypt and accesskey.Encode take no Registry, so the application applies the rule; their documentation and extension.Placement say so. - §17 and §51 give the step-10 codes only for a directly supplied release, as step 10 does; a network source discards a failing one at step 9. - Step 9 reports ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE and no other code, whatever the failure of the source. provider/drand.Client keeps each relay's failure as text only (errors.Join made a relay's ERR_ROUND_MISMATCH match with errors.Is), and capsule.Open keeps only the text of a source error that carries another code (a caller's source failing with ERR_RELEASE_INVALID gave that code at step 9). A context that ended stays detectable: Fetch now has a single failure path, so the canceled and deadline cases are deterministic. - TestExtensionPlacement covers the noncritical array of a .dkk: with the object-blind extension.CheckNoncritical at step 9.a it fails. - Editorial: §28.1 "analizan solo la cabecera age", one arrow at step 9, two §76 introductions; §73 lines for release sources and placement. - testdata/README.md says the corpus registers its extensions in both arrays of every object; traceability, CHANGELOG and both READMEs (integrity holds against whoever lacks the file keys, §27, §55.1) follow. Spec dated 28 September 2026; new SHA-256 in spec/README.md. No fixture or vector changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	1 week ago
dev	c57ed4869c	Spec v0.8.2: corrections from the formal review ... A formal review of the whole v0.8.2 text found it approvable after these corrections, recorded in §76 ("Correcciones de la revisión formal"): - §27 no longer calls header_binding the authenticity of PUBLIC_HEADER: it binds the header to the opened control, never authorship or date (§55.1); the age MAC only protects against whoever lacks the file key. - §63 steps 9 and 10: a network source (relay, Release API, cache) MUST verify every response and gives ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE at step 9 when none verifies; the step-10 codes are for a directly supplied release. The reference already behaved so; TestReleaseFromANetworkSource pins both paths. - §54 and §72: registrations declare the objects and arrays where an extension may appear, and a known extension out of place counts as unknown there. The reference gains the optional extension.Placement interface, used at steps 4, 9.a and 14. - §63 step 11 fixes the GT serialization hashed by H2 (kilic/kyber order) with the frozen vector H2(e(G1, G2))[:16] = cb87319f..., shared as testdata/vectors/tlock_ibe.json; H2-H4 are cited to drand/kyber. - Step 5 makes the SEALED_CONTROL read mandatory, step 15 names ERR_HEADER_BINDING, §21 makes capsule_id 16 CSPRNG bytes a MUST, §76 is made accurate (four dk1.json vectors, the §36 time_only rule, two cases rewritten against the texts that really existed), and editorial fixes in §5, §36, §55.1, §69.1 and §77. §73 lists the three new decisions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 weeks ago
dev	f6f2e9f55f	Spec v0.8.2 amendment: canonical point encoding; no library error text ... Amendment of the unreleased v0.8.2, recorded in §76 with its case: the second implementation's phase-2 research found that tlock-js over @noble/curves 1.9.7 accepts U re-encoded as c0 + p and a signature x + p and returns the same file key, while the reference rejects both (noble 1.9.7 differed from kilic on 5,615 of 41,686 encodings), and the spec did not say which encodings are valid. - §12.2 defines the canonical encoding of a BLS12-381 point (drand's compressed ZCash form) and requires decoders to reject every other byte string; §12.1 applies it to public_key. - §63 step 10 applies it to the release signature (ERR_RELEASE_INVALID) and step 11 defines the tlock stanza body U || V || W (96 + 16 + 16 bytes for Quicknet) with a canonical, non-infinity U (ERR_INTEGRITY). - §64 gains ten mutations, exported to mutations.json (65 cases). The signature x + p case uses published Quicknet round 1004, the first after 1000 whose x allows x + p < 2^381. The reference already gave every stated code and step. Errors no longer copy text from tlock, kyber, age, drand or kyber-bls12381. kyber's IBE error carried the candidate plaintext and r, and with one bit of W flipped the message disclosed the real tlock file key with that bit flipped. Every such place now uses a fixed reason with its normative sentinel; TestTlockFailureDiagnosticsCarryNoSecrets fails with the old wrapping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 weeks ago
dev	382006649f	Spec v0.8.2 refinements: error precedence, trust model, strict order ... Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the §76 v0.8.2 subsection: - §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8. - §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory. - §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness). - Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers, §15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order, §12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table of implementation limits. Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 weeks ago
dev	9cbcab10b2	Hand-written CBOR codec and shared test vectors (plan steps 2b and 3) ... Step 2b: package codec is rewritten without reflection or struct tags. A strict Decoder accepts only the spec §58 profile, Unmarshal decodes, re-encodes and compares, Peek reads the type tag and version, and Walk is a bounded iterative helper for vectors and fuzzing. Every schema has its own hand-written encoder and decoder that checks all CDDL rules before the fields with their own error codes. github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2 and github.com/x448/float16 are gone; nothing replaces them. Valid objects encode and decode exactly as before (1.34 million differential verdicts); the invalid-input differences are documented in CHANGELOG and traceability decision 12. A review found and fixed an access_policy check that truncated to uint8. Step 3: testdata gains vectors/cbor.json (generic and per-schema CBOR vectors), vectors/mutations.json (the 55-case mutation corpus, replayable offline), vectors/inspect_differential.json (1,825 fixed-seed mutations with the Go verdict) and one inspect -json golden per fixture, all regenerated byte-identically by genfixtures and documented in testdata/README.md for second implementations. Gate green with 90 s of fuzzing per target on all 15 targets; codec at 100 % coverage; pre-existing testdata byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 weeks ago