As the author asks: the rest of the envelope can be stored inside a host
file, an image, a video or any file, and each address of the locator says
at which byte it starts (44.1).
- The envelope is split: its age header, up to the MAC, goes in the
time-locked locator, and only the rest, nonce and STREAM, is stored
outside. Those bytes carry no mark: nobody can tell they are an age
file, let alone a capsule. The reader joins both and decrypts with
I_SOBRE.
- An address is a map with the URI and an optional offset; the reader
asks only for those bytes, with an HTTP range when it can, and checks
their SHA-256.
- Concealment, not steganography: an analysis of the host can see extra
bytes, not what they are. Only storage that keeps the file byte for
byte works; social networks and messaging applications spoil a host.
- The CDDL of the locator follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The author's decisions after the review of 1 October 2026:
- Recognized authorities (29.13): a list pinned in the SDK for the
certificates of signers and for timestamp authorities, checked at the
time of the seal, without revocation. Without it a certificate or a
seal was checked with what it brings itself. New verdicts F7 and S6.
- The key of words is salted with capsule_id too (salt v2), so that the
capsules of a popular round cannot be attacked together; the writer
rejects controls and ignorable code points and should reject short or
repeated words. New vector.
- What is stored outside is an opaque envelope: the .dkc encrypted for a
random identity whose key goes in the time-locked locator, padded to
4096 bytes, with https and ipfs addresses only.
- AUTHOR_MESSAGE is ASCII text of 99 bytes with the digest in hex and an
8-character code to compare before signing.
Fixes from the three reports: SIG_PART over the exact content of key 2
for any alg; one procedure per signer in 29.10, with F1 only for the
shape of what is present; a closed table of OIDs and DER with sorted SET
OF; the token checks its content-type and message-digest; S4 needs
genTime + accuracy before the round; F1 or F2 in 29.9 and the noble text;
alg and seal_type 4294967295 reserved for tests, and the five v0.10
vectors that change verdict listed in 76; the leftovers of v0.10 in
55.1, 27, 63, 72 and 73; the note as one line of the declared author
rules; extension data never gives ERR_NON_CANONICAL_CBOR; what a
certificate signature reveals; blind signing in 7.9; no secrets at rest
while waiting for a signature; the figures of 76.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Delivery 2 of capsule format 3, with the decisions the author took on
1 October 2026 after the review of Fable and Astra:
- A fixed area of 32 KiB for every capsule of a v0.11 writer, signed or
not, and 64 KiB only when the person enlarges it expressly (29.2).
- What is signed (29.8): AUTHOR_MESSAGE of 66 bytes over control_commit
of CONTROL_SIG, without I_PAYLOAD and with payload_length at zero,
head_digest and signers_digest. The size of the area never changes
what is signed, so the area can grow after signing.
- alg 1, strict Ed25519 with dkauthor1 keys (29.9, 29.12), and alg 2, a
detached CMS signature with one or more X.509 signers, the list of
required signers in key 1 and a CAdES-T timestamp per signer (29.10).
- seal_type 2, an RFC 3161 seal over SEAL_SUBJECT for capsules without a
certificate signature (29.11), and the verdicts F2 to F6 and S3 to S5.
- The key of words (38.1), the public note datekeys.note (24.1) and the
capsule extension datekeys.capsule of the .dkk, with the note, the date
and a locator encrypted for the date (44.1).
- Writer rules 19 to 24, privacy, threat model 7.9, mutation tests,
compatibility with v0.10 readers, the extension registry, provisional
items (the 32 KiB to be measured) and the change log in 76.
The CDDL adds the schemas of alg 1, alg 2, seal_type 2 and the two
extensions. The reference still implements v0.10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- R6c only rejects a best-fit projection with '/', '\', ':' or U+0000,
and still applies R3, R5, R6 and R6b to it: bestfit1250 maps "¿" to
'?' and bestfit874 maps "§" and "♥" to C0 controls, so the stricter
rule would have refused ordinary Spanish names.
- Step 17: codes other than ERR_INTEGRITY are reported only after
reading PAYLOAD_AGE to EOF; 17.1 leaves the padding to 17.8; 17.3 and
17.6 never fail. The precedence case is the cut right after a
complete chunk, where filippo.io/age and age-encryption differ.
- Verdicts: the first matching row decides, and alg or seal_type are
read only from content that meets its schema. Sections 58 and 70
exempt SECURITY_CBOR, which only changes verdicts.
- Normative verdict texts, and the presentation rule for any text
output, paths included.
- The sink rule of section 70, the test-vector exemption of writer
rule 13 and the mtime rule 16.
- More mutations and vector coverage; a complete list of changed test
data in section 76 (checked: only two of the 125 mutations and none
of the 4380 differential cases leave VERSION 3); corrected cases.
- A closed list of the Unicode and WindowsBestFit tables, and
editorial fixes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Delivery 1 of capsule format 3, as the author decided on 30-09-2026:
several files with their paths, sizes, SHA-256 and dates, encrypted in
the plaintext of PAYLOAD_AGE, and a security area that later versions
will fill with an author signature and a timestamp seal without
changing the format.
- VERSION 3 and CONTROL_CBOR schema 3; writers write only format 3,
readers open the three formats.
- BODY with a 12-byte frame (AREA_LEN, SECURITY_LEN, HEAD_LEN), the
security area fixed by spec version (512 bytes here), the head and
the files (new sections 29.2 to 29.7).
- The head is always version 1 in format 3; path rules R1 to R10 on
pinned Unicode 17.0.0 and WindowsBestFit tables; text rules; the
verdicts X, F0, F1, S0, S1 and S2 and their presentation.
- Step 17 split into 17.1 to 17.8 with its precedence, and the new
code ERR_HEAD_INVALID.
- Atomic delivery of several files (56), limits (57), writer rules 13
to 18, mutation tests, fixtures and the change log in 76.
- The CDDL gains control-v3, security, author-signature, seal, head and
file.
The reference implementation still implements v0.9. The design, its
reviews and the author's decisions are in the private docs repository,
spec_v0.10/formato3_diseno.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The final review of the draft found 22 problems, and none had been applied
yet. All of them are applied now, together with four places that repeated
them (§62.1 rules 1 and 4, §76 changes 4 and 10).
- §29.1, §76 change 4: 32-bit arithmetic first gives a wrong P at
L = 2 113 929 217 with signed operators and at L = 4 227 858 433 with
>>> 0, not at 2^32 + 1. The vector table gains a row for each, checked
against a BigInt Padme. Above 2^32, Padme exceeds bloque256 except at
L_MAX. The Node log2 error changes E and lastBits, not P or S.
- §56, §76 change 4: a reader MUST NOT present the content as valid before
step 17 ends; a streaming reader MUST NOT write the padding and MUST
signal the step 17 error so that what it wrote is discarded. The author
chose this over the stricter rule, which forbade delivering any byte
before step 17 and so the streaming Open(dst) of the reference.
- §64: the 15 and 17 stanza mutations recalculate the PRELUDE and
header_binding; every time_and_key mutation offers the identity, because
any change breaks the capsule_digest of a .dkk; the duplicate recipient
mutation names its identity. Three new mutations cover the shape of
payload_length (7 or 9 bytes, a CBOR integer); the format 2 cbor.json
vectors of §76 list them too.
- §39, §62.1 rule 4: the official test vectors may show which slots are
dummies. §70, §62.1 rule 1: the format 2 rule binds implementations that
write capsules, and a test vector generator MAY write format 1.
- §62 step 8 gets the 64 MiB limit of §61 step 6.
- Accuracy: §22 (an older reader detects a new padding code only after the
network request; the .dkk schema is §41), §37 and §76 change 10 (the §63
rules do not detect those recipients), §55.2 (the writer knows the number
of parties; relays are §48), §76 changes 1 and 8.
- Wording: §62.1 rules 7 and 11, §63 step 4, §76 change 11, the field names
in the CDDL comments, and a v0.9 entry in spec/README.md.
go test ./... passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Draft decided by the author on 29-09-2026: format 2 with exactly 16
X25519 stanzas in INNER_ACCESS_AGE (dummies, shuffled), payload padding
(code 1 bloque256, code 2 reforzado = max(bloque256, Padme)) with L and
the code in CONTROL_CBOR v2, VERSION 2 so v0.8.2 readers reject early,
a privacy section (§55.2) and writer rules (§62.1). The CDDL holds the
draft schemas. The fixes from the final review were being applied when
work stopped: they may be partial. See App/docs/HANDOFF.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Amendment of the unreleased v0.8.2, recorded in §76 with its case: the
second implementation's phase-2 research found that tlock-js over
@noble/curves 1.9.7 accepts U re-encoded as c0 + p and a signature
x + p and returns the same file key, while the reference rejects both
(noble 1.9.7 differed from kilic on 5,615 of 41,686 encodings), and the
spec did not say which encodings are valid.
- §12.2 defines the canonical encoding of a BLS12-381 point (drand's
compressed ZCash form) and requires decoders to reject every other
byte string; §12.1 applies it to public_key.
- §63 step 10 applies it to the release signature (ERR_RELEASE_INVALID)
and step 11 defines the tlock stanza body U || V || W (96 + 16 + 16
bytes for Quicknet) with a canonical, non-infinity U (ERR_INTEGRITY).
- §64 gains ten mutations, exported to mutations.json (65 cases). The
signature x + p case uses published Quicknet round 1004, the first
after 1000 whose x allows x + p < 2^381. The reference already gave
every stated code and step.
Errors no longer copy text from tlock, kyber, age, drand or
kyber-bls12381. kyber's IBE error carried the candidate plaintext and r,
and with one bit of W flipped the message disclosed the real tlock file
key with that bit flipped. Every such place now uses a fixed reason with
its normative sentinel; TestTlockFailureDiagnosticsCarryNoSecrets fails
with the old wrapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the
§76 v0.8.2 subsection:
- §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag
and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in
ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope
paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8.
- §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which
step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims
go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory.
- §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of
extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness).
- Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers,
§15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length
lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order,
§12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table
of implementation limits.
Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new
OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is
ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not
credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so
its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three
vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 2b: package codec is rewritten without reflection or struct tags. A
strict Decoder accepts only the spec §58 profile, Unmarshal decodes,
re-encodes and compares, Peek reads the type tag and version, and Walk is a
bounded iterative helper for vectors and fuzzing. Every schema has its own
hand-written encoder and decoder that checks all CDDL rules before the
fields with their own error codes. github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2 and
github.com/x448/float16 are gone; nothing replaces them. Valid objects
encode and decode exactly as before (1.34 million differential verdicts);
the invalid-input differences are documented in CHANGELOG and
traceability decision 12. A review found and fixed an access_policy check
that truncated to uint8.
Step 3: testdata gains vectors/cbor.json (generic and per-schema CBOR
vectors), vectors/mutations.json (the 55-case mutation corpus, replayable
offline), vectors/inspect_differential.json (1,825 fixed-seed mutations
with the Go verdict) and one inspect -json golden per fixture, all
regenerated byte-identically by genfixtures and documented in
testdata/README.md for second implementations.
Gate green with 90 s of fuzzing per target on all 15 targets; codec at
100 % coverage; pre-existing testdata byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extension data becomes a non-empty opaque bstr bounded by the frame of its
container; the base protocol never decodes or validates it. Arrays hold at
most 64 extensions, extension_version is bounded to 2^32-1 and the profile's
period and genesis_time to 2^53-1. The multiplicity exception is removed,
ERR_EXTENSION_DATA_INVALID is added, the §57 limits become MUST with an
explicit error mapping, §58 names the protocol's CBOR profile and §72 sets
the registration rules. §76 records the six reproducible cases behind the
change. The implementation follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The module is imported as g.activething.com/go/DateKeys, the path the
project's Gitea advertises. The .github directory is gone: workflows
now live in .gitea/workflows, use the gitea.com action mirrors and
install every tool from its Go module; releases go to this Gitea with
goreleaser and a key-based cosign signature; Dependabot is replaced by
a nightly report of available updates. scripts/check.sh runs the same
checks on any machine and is the gate while the server has no runner.
SECURITY.md, README and CONTRIBUTING no longer refer to GitHub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dev