Spec section 44.1 makes unusable a locator whose round or chain is not that
of its DateKey, and its plaintext is 4096 bytes or a multiple. ParseInfo
checked only the round: it now checks that the chain hash is lower-case
hexadecimal and, for a profile this module pins, the chain of the DateKey;
and that the body after the age header holds a plaintext of 4096 bytes or a
multiple, so that a header without a body is refused. Info.Extension, which
reads what it writes, refuses a DateKey of a profile that is not pinned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Spec v0.12, section 44.1, already asked for the CID in its canonical form
and an IPv6 literal: a CID with a character more, of zero bits, decoded to
the same bytes and passed, and https://[[2000::]/ passed because checkHost
trimmed every bracket. isCIDv1 refuses 5 or more bits left over, and
checkHost takes one pair of brackets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
On an IPv6-only network with DNS64, a name that has only IPv4 addresses
resolves to an address of NAT64, which spec v0.12, section 44.1, always
rejected: a reader on such a network, as many mobile ones, could not
download the rest of an envelope. The draft v0.13 counts an address of
64:ff9b::/96, or of the NAT64 prefix of the network, by the IPv4 address it
holds (RFC 6052). An address of NAT64 written in a locator is still
rejected. Section 76 records the change with its case.
locator.CheckResolvedIP implements it for the readers that download, and
testdata/vectors/resolved_ip.json gives 42 cases. SpecVersion stays 0.12
until the author approves the draft.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The text of 44.1 now says what the reference already refused and a
second implementation that followed the text would have accepted:
segments of 1 to 63 characters that neither start nor end with a hyphen,
the scheme in lower case, 0x and the local names in either case, an IPv4
without leading zeros, and a CID of at most 128 characters in canonical
base32, with minimal varints and a digest of at least one byte. A port is
written without leading zeros: the reference accepted 0443 and 00443 and
refused 000443, the same number, and now refuses the three. Change 6 of
section 76 records it, and section 64 lists the cases.
locator.json is made again with 30 more addresses, 247 in all, and
TestAddresses checks the same rules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- uri_cases: the first and the last address of each IPv4 block of 44.1,
with the public addresses next to them; the IPv6 blocks and the
addresses that hold an IPv4 one; the local names; characters outside
RFC 3986 and broken percent signs; "." and ".." segments; base32 that
is not a CID v1.
- mixed: a locator whose http and NAT64 addresses a reader rejects, and
whose third address it uses to find the rest.
- rest_cases: the rest alone, a host with bytes after the rest, a rest
with a byte changed, an offset that is not its own, a rest cut short.
- extension_cases: a locator sealed for round 1001 with a DateKey of
round 1000, and the other data that a reader cannot use.
- plaintext_cases: change 7, the bases 4094, 4070 and 3837 completed to
4096 with an empty key 6 or a length not in its shortest form, and a
defect in each field of the map.
- padding_cases: the bases 3837, 4070, 4094 and 4095 and those of the
next multiple, checked against the rule of 44.1.
The generator checks every case against this module and moves to its
own file. The vector is frozen: delete it to make it again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
FuzzUnmarshal, FuzzParseInfo and FuzzCheckURI, in scripts/fuzz.sh: no
panic, no usable address that the rules refuse, ERR_EXTENSION_DATA_INVALID
as the only code of the data of datekeys.capsule, and a host shown that is
in the address as written. 40 s each with -parallel 4, clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes of the review of the session of 1 and 2 October that the text of
spec v0.11 already asks for:
- authorkey: String and GoString hide the secret key, which only Secret
returns; ParsePublic refuses a key that is not a point of the curve
(ed25519strict.OnCurve, checked against the square root of testkit).
- capsule: a typed nil in AuthorKey, CMSSigner or Sealer is an error, never
a capsule without the signature or the seal that was asked for. A panic
while evaluating the signature or the seal fails only that part, F1 or
S2, not both. OpenOptions.Accept sees the verdicts before step 18 and can
refuse to publish the files.
- extension.CheckWrite, the rule of encoders of spec 72: the writers of
capsules and .dkk files refuse datekeys.note and datekeys.capsule outside
the arrays where they are registered, or with invalid data.
- CLI: encrypt -sign shows the author key and the code of AUTHOR_MESSAGE
before it signs (rule 20); decrypt -expect-author compares the key of an
F4 and writes nothing unless it matches; decrypt notifies a public note
that it does not show; the lines of the verdicts break at the last space
that fits, each row after the first behind a mark, so that the terminal
never breaks them; L is the payload, not the content.
- locator: a reader rejects an address that breaks 44.1 and keeps the
others; addresses refuse the special-purpose blocks of IANA, IPv6 outside
2000::/3, localhost and local names, characters outside RFC 3986, dot
segments, and a CID that does not decode to version 1 and a multihash;
ParseInfo checks that the locator is an age file with one tlock stanza
for the round of its DateKey; Info.Extension reads what it writes; its
errors carry no normative code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixtures format3_signed_cms (alg 2, two certificates, each sealed, F6) and
format3_sealed (alg 1 and a seal of seal_type 2, F4 and S4), with the
certificates, SIGNERS, the commitments, SEAL_SUBJECT, the token and the
result of each signer in their records. vectors/security_cms.json has 22
frozen areas with their context and verdicts (F1, F2, F5, F6, S1 to S5), and
vectors/locator.json the extension datekeys.capsule with its envelope hidden
in a host, its locator sealed with tlock, the padding at the boundaries and
the rules of the addresses. The README of testdata describes all of it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CheckURI works on the raw authority, as an HTTP client reads it: no percent
signs, userinfo or backslashes, a host of letters, digits and hyphens or a
public IP literal, a port from 1 to 65535, and Host returns that host. The
integers of the locator stop at 2^53 - 1, and Info.Extension refuses what
ParseInfo would. extension.Standard validates datekeys.capsule through
locator.Standard, and Info.OpenLocator ties the locator to the round of its
own DateKey.
inspect shows the public note as text of the creator, with its prefix and
wrapping and the warning, and says when a note is unusable. encrypt -note
warns that it is public. decrypt -expect-author fails before the release
is requested when the capsule is not format 3. Author key files are read
with the work factor of the spec as their maximum, the passphrase is not
read from a terminal, and two copies of secrets are cleared.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
locator has the data of the extension of a .dkk, the locator sealed with
tlock for the round of the DateKey, and the envelope: the .dkc in age, split
into a header that the locator carries and a rest that can hide inside
another file. The plaintext of the locator measures the least multiple of
4096 bytes that holds it. Nothing is downloaded: a reader gives the rest to
OpenEnvelope, which checks its size and digests.
README and CHANGELOG describe what the draft adds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dev