EncryptFiles writes format 3 (spec 29.2 to 29.6, 61, 62, 62.1): the
files of a list of Sources, each read twice, with the comment and the
declared author.
- Before anything is written: the paths and the texts are checked with
the rules of the reader, in the words of a writer, naming the rule
and the character, and the two paths of an R7 collision (rule 15);
the comment has its CR LF and lone CR turned into LF (29.6); L is
measured with a head whose salt and SHA-256 are zero, as long as the
final one, and the first reading hashes each file, which must have
exactly its Size.
- The files go in the byte order of their paths (R8), whatever the
order of the Sources; the mtime is kept only from 1970 to 9999,
never clipped (rule 16); at least one file or a comment (rule 14).
- The head, with a fresh salt, the control and the security area are
decoded with the rules of the reader before sealing (rule 17), and
the frame is checked against L. The area is 512 bytes with the
empty security, whatever the options (rule 13).
- The second reading writes each file into PAYLOAD_AGE and fails if its
size or SHA-256 changed (rule 18).
- Encrypt and EncryptFiles share the sealing; Encrypt writes format 2
only with the new TestVectors option (rule 1), and takes no head.
The test data generators set it, and so does the CLI until step 5
moves it to EncryptFiles.
- Result.Head is the head written. DecodeHead keeps the check of the
critical extensions apart, so that the self-check decodes the head
as the one of the control does.
- The examples and the live test write with EncryptFiles.
- The reader tests had a literal U+202E, now escaped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved
by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only;
Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the
verdict v0.8.2 gave it.
Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39):
- VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other
value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2.
- CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6,
payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and
key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without
extensions, whatever L.
- The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17
checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes.
- INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials,
and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order.
Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the
source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not
canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient);
self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE.
The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format.
Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against
math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats
with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness
by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The
format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the
differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2
fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the
READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- extension: data is an opaque []byte; New takes []byte and rejects empty
data; key 2 must be a non-empty shortest-form bstr; at most 64 extensions
per array; extension_version <= 2^32-1; CheckDisjoint is a linear merge;
optional DataValidator with ERR_EXTENSION_DATA_INVALID for known critical
extensions and Unusable reports for known noncritical ones.
- capsule, accesskey: frame limits on encode and decode with ERR_INTEGRITY;
Encrypt and MarshalBody decode their own output before sealing or
returning it; unusable extensions are reported.
- profile: period and genesis_time bounded to 2^53-1, genesis decoded as
unsigned.
- codec: Valid removed; empty values never encode as null.
- Regression tests for the nested-data seal/open asymmetry, the
nondeterministic verdict on NaN-keyed data and the quadratic disjointness
check; three new §64 mutations and five more.
- Fixtures: time_only_extensions regenerated with opaque data, new
time_and_key_portable_extension.dkk; genfixtures gains -only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The module is imported as g.activething.com/go/DateKeys, the path the
project's Gitea advertises. The .github directory is gone: workflows
now live in .gitea/workflows, use the gitea.com action mirrors and
install every tool from its Go module; releases go to this Gitea with
goreleaser and a key-based cosign signature; Dependabot is replaced by
a nightly report of available updates. scripts/check.sh runs the same
checks on any machine and is the gate while the server has no runner.
SECURITY.md, README and CONTRIBUTING no longer refer to GitHub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dev