Initial implementation of the DateKeys Protocol v0.8.1
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
// Package provider defines conditions, releases and release sources (spec §9,
// §45-§52) and the local verification every release must pass.
//
// A release is never trusted because of where it came from: the DateKeys API,
// a cache or a relay are untrusted transports (spec §3, §48, §52). A remote
// "verified: true" has no security value (spec §51).
package provider
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/drand/drand/v2/common"
datekeys "g.activething.com/go/DateKeys"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/profile"
Initial implementation of the DateKeys Protocol v0.8.1
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
)
// Condition is the time condition of a Quicknet-style profile: a round.
type Condition struct {
Round uint64
}
// Release is the material that satisfies a condition. For drand it is the
// BLS signature of the round.
type Release struct {
Round uint64
Signature [ ] byte
}
Spec v0.8.2: corrections from the formal review
A formal review of the whole v0.8.2 text found it approvable after
these corrections, recorded in §76 ("Correcciones de la revisión
formal"):
- §27 no longer calls header_binding the authenticity of PUBLIC_HEADER:
it binds the header to the opened control, never authorship or date
(§55.1); the age MAC only protects against whoever lacks the file key.
- §63 steps 9 and 10: a network source (relay, Release API, cache) MUST
verify every response and gives ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE at step 9 when
none verifies; the step-10 codes are for a directly supplied release.
The reference already behaved so; TestReleaseFromANetworkSource pins
both paths.
- §54 and §72: registrations declare the objects and arrays where an
extension may appear, and a known extension out of place counts as
unknown there. The reference gains the optional extension.Placement
interface, used at steps 4, 9.a and 14.
- §63 step 11 fixes the GT serialization hashed by H2 (kilic/kyber order)
with the frozen vector H2(e(G1, G2))[:16] = cb87319f..., shared as
testdata/vectors/tlock_ibe.json; H2-H4 are cited to drand/kyber.
- Step 5 makes the SEALED_CONTROL read mandatory, step 15 names
ERR_HEADER_BINDING, §21 makes capsule_id 16 CSPRNG bytes a MUST, §76
is made accurate (four dk1.json vectors, the §36 time_only rule, two
cases rewritten against the texts that really existed), and editorial
fixes in §5, §36, §55.1, §69.1 and §77. §73 lists the three new
decisions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
// ReleaseSource fetches the release of a condition. Callers always verify the
// release, with Verify (spec §63 step 10).
//
// A source that fetches releases over a network (a relay, the Release API or
// a cache) must also verify each response with Verify and discard the one
// that fails, and report datekeys.ErrReleaseUnavailable when no response
// passes (spec §63 step 9), as provider/drand.Client does: an invalid release
// from the network is then reported at step 9, not with the codes of step 10.
// A source that hands over a release the caller supplies directly need not
// verify it; its release gets the codes of step 10.
Initial implementation of the DateKeys Protocol v0.8.1
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
//
// Errors should wrap datekeys.ErrReleaseUnavailable when the release cannot be
// obtained, for example because the round is not published yet.
type ReleaseSource interface {
Fetch ( ctx context . Context , p * profile . Profile , c Condition ) ( Release , error )
}
// ReleaseSourceFunc adapts a function to ReleaseSource.
type ReleaseSourceFunc func ( ctx context . Context , p * profile . Profile , c Condition ) ( Release , error )
// Fetch calls f.
func ( f ReleaseSourceFunc ) Fetch ( ctx context . Context , p * profile . Profile , c Condition ) ( Release , error ) {
return f ( ctx , p , c )
}
Spec v0.8.2 refinements: error precedence, trust model, strict order
Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the
§76 v0.8.2 subsection:
- §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag
and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in
ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope
paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8.
- §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which
step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims
go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory.
- §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of
extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness).
- Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers,
§15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length
lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order,
§12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table
of implementation limits.
Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new
OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is
ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not
credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so
its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three
vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
// Verify checks a release locally against the pinned profile (spec §17, §51),
// in the order of spec §63 step 10: the expected round (ErrRoundMismatch),
Spec v0.8.2 amendment: canonical point encoding; no library error text
Amendment of the unreleased v0.8.2, recorded in §76 with its case: the
second implementation's phase-2 research found that tlock-js over
@noble/curves 1.9.7 accepts U re-encoded as c0 + p and a signature
x + p and returns the same file key, while the reference rejects both
(noble 1.9.7 differed from kilic on 5,615 of 41,686 encodings), and the
spec did not say which encodings are valid.
- §12.2 defines the canonical encoding of a BLS12-381 point (drand's
compressed ZCash form) and requires decoders to reject every other
byte string; §12.1 applies it to public_key.
- §63 step 10 applies it to the release signature (ERR_RELEASE_INVALID)
and step 11 defines the tlock stanza body U || V || W (96 + 16 + 16
bytes for Quicknet) with a canonical, non-infinity U (ERR_INTEGRITY).
- §64 gains ten mutations, exported to mutations.json (65 cases). The
signature x + p case uses published Quicknet round 1004, the first
after 1000 whose x allows x + p < 2^381. The reference already gave
every stated code and step.
Errors no longer copy text from tlock, kyber, age, drand or
kyber-bls12381. kyber's IBE error carried the candidate plaintext and r,
and with one bit of W flipped the message disclosed the real tlock file
key with that bit flipped. Every such place now uses a fixed reason with
its normative sentinel; TestTlockFailureDiagnosticsCarryNoSecrets fails
with the old wrapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
// then the signature (ErrReleaseInvalid), which must be the canonical
// encoding of a point of the signature group of the scheme other than the
// point at infinity (spec §12.2), with the length of that group, and a valid
// BLS signature of the round under the pinned public key. The chain hash is
// covered because the pinned public key is bound to it by profile.Validate.
//
// The BLS verification of drand decodes the signature with the canonical
// decoder of kilic/bls12-381, which rejects every other encoding, and the
// point at infinity never verifies because the pinned public key is not the
// point at infinity. The error of drand is not copied.
Initial implementation of the DateKeys Protocol v0.8.1
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
func Verify ( p * profile . Profile , c Condition , r Release ) error {
if c . Round == 0 || c . Round > p . MaxRound ( ) {
return fmt . Errorf ( "provider: round %d outside the range of %s: %w" , c . Round , p . ID , datekeys . ErrDateKeyInvalid )
}
if r . Round != c . Round {
return fmt . Errorf ( "provider: release for round %d, expected %d: %w" , r . Round , c . Round , datekeys . ErrRoundMismatch )
}
scheme , err := p . DrandScheme ( )
if err != nil {
return err
}
if want := scheme . SigGroup . PointLen ( ) ; len ( r . Signature ) != want {
return fmt . Errorf ( "provider: signature is %d bytes, %s uses %d: %w" , len ( r . Signature ) , scheme . Name , want , datekeys . ErrReleaseInvalid )
}
key := scheme . KeyGroup . Point ( )
if err := key . UnmarshalBinary ( p . PublicKey ) ; err != nil {
Spec v0.8.2 amendment: canonical point encoding; no library error text
Amendment of the unreleased v0.8.2, recorded in §76 with its case: the
second implementation's phase-2 research found that tlock-js over
@noble/curves 1.9.7 accepts U re-encoded as c0 + p and a signature
x + p and returns the same file key, while the reference rejects both
(noble 1.9.7 differed from kilic on 5,615 of 41,686 encodings), and the
spec did not say which encodings are valid.
- §12.2 defines the canonical encoding of a BLS12-381 point (drand's
compressed ZCash form) and requires decoders to reject every other
byte string; §12.1 applies it to public_key.
- §63 step 10 applies it to the release signature (ERR_RELEASE_INVALID)
and step 11 defines the tlock stanza body U || V || W (96 + 16 + 16
bytes for Quicknet) with a canonical, non-infinity U (ERR_INTEGRITY).
- §64 gains ten mutations, exported to mutations.json (65 cases). The
signature x + p case uses published Quicknet round 1004, the first
after 1000 whose x allows x + p < 2^381. The reference already gave
every stated code and step.
Errors no longer copy text from tlock, kyber, age, drand or
kyber-bls12381. kyber's IBE error carried the candidate plaintext and r,
and with one bit of W flipped the message disclosed the real tlock file
key with that bit flipped. Every such place now uses a fixed reason with
its normative sentinel; TestTlockFailureDiagnosticsCarryNoSecrets fails
with the old wrapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
return fmt . Errorf ( "provider: pinned public key of %s is not the canonical encoding of a point of the key group: %w" , p . ID , datekeys . ErrUnknownProfile )
Initial implementation of the DateKeys Protocol v0.8.1
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
}
beacon := & common . Beacon { Round : r . Round , Signature : r . Signature }
if err := scheme . VerifyBeacon ( beacon , key ) ; err != nil {
Spec v0.8.2 amendment: canonical point encoding; no library error text
Amendment of the unreleased v0.8.2, recorded in §76 with its case: the
second implementation's phase-2 research found that tlock-js over
@noble/curves 1.9.7 accepts U re-encoded as c0 + p and a signature
x + p and returns the same file key, while the reference rejects both
(noble 1.9.7 differed from kilic on 5,615 of 41,686 encodings), and the
spec did not say which encodings are valid.
- §12.2 defines the canonical encoding of a BLS12-381 point (drand's
compressed ZCash form) and requires decoders to reject every other
byte string; §12.1 applies it to public_key.
- §63 step 10 applies it to the release signature (ERR_RELEASE_INVALID)
and step 11 defines the tlock stanza body U || V || W (96 + 16 + 16
bytes for Quicknet) with a canonical, non-infinity U (ERR_INTEGRITY).
- §64 gains ten mutations, exported to mutations.json (65 cases). The
signature x + p case uses published Quicknet round 1004, the first
after 1000 whose x allows x + p < 2^381. The reference already gave
every stated code and step.
Errors no longer copy text from tlock, kyber, age, drand or
kyber-bls12381. kyber's IBE error carried the candidate plaintext and r,
and with one bit of W flipped the message disclosed the real tlock file
key with that bit flipped. Every such place now uses a fixed reason with
its normative sentinel; TestTlockFailureDiagnosticsCarryNoSecrets fails
with the old wrapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
return fmt . Errorf ( "provider: the signature is not a canonical point encoding, or does not verify as the BLS signature of round %d under %s: %w" , r . Round , p . ID , datekeys . ErrReleaseInvalid )
Initial implementation of the DateKeys Protocol v0.8.1
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
}
return nil
}