Initial implementation of the DateKeys Protocol v0.8.1
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
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# Specification
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- `DateKeys_Protocol_Specification_v0.8.2.md`: frozen copy of the normative
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Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9
The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved
by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only;
Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the
verdict v0.8.2 gave it.
Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39):
- VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other
value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2.
- CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6,
payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and
key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without
extensions, whatever L.
- The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17
checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes.
- INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials,
and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order.
Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the
source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not
canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient);
self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE.
The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format.
Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against
math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats
with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness
by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The
format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the
differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2
fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the
READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
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draft v0.8.2 (28 September 2026), tagged `spec-v0.8.2`. SHA-256:
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Spec v0.8.2: second-round corrections from the formal review
The second round of the formal review confirmed the nine corrections of
c57ed48 and asked for these, recorded in §76 as corrections 4 to 6 and
an editorial note:
- §72: an encoder MUST NOT write a registered extension in an object or
array it is not registered for; §54: a reader MUST NOT interpret the
data of a noncritical one it ignores for that reason. capsule.Encrypt
and accesskey.Encode take no Registry, so the application applies the
rule; their documentation and extension.Placement say so.
- §17 and §51 give the step-10 codes only for a directly supplied
release, as step 10 does; a network source discards a failing one at
step 9.
- Step 9 reports ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE and no other code, whatever the
failure of the source. provider/drand.Client keeps each relay's failure
as text only (errors.Join made a relay's ERR_ROUND_MISMATCH match with
errors.Is), and capsule.Open keeps only the text of a source error that
carries another code (a caller's source failing with
ERR_RELEASE_INVALID gave that code at step 9). A context that ended
stays detectable: Fetch now has a single failure path, so the canceled
and deadline cases are deterministic.
- TestExtensionPlacement covers the noncritical array of a .dkk: with
the object-blind extension.CheckNoncritical at step 9.a it fails.
- Editorial: §28.1 "analizan solo la cabecera age", one arrow at step 9,
two §76 introductions; §73 lines for release sources and placement.
- testdata/README.md says the corpus registers its extensions in both
arrays of every object; traceability, CHANGELOG and both READMEs
(integrity holds against whoever lacks the file keys, §27, §55.1)
follow. Spec dated 28 September 2026; new SHA-256 in spec/README.md.
No fixture or vector changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
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`5cfa32034ea2ba02e77676e015cad7bba09796383afdda6634aaa017a5a23351`.
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v0.8.2 replaces v0.8.1 with a normative change to extensions, refined
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Spec v0.8.2 refinements: error precedence, trust model, strict order
Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the
§76 v0.8.2 subsection:
- §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag
and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in
ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope
paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8.
- §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which
step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims
go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory.
- §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of
extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness).
- Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers,
§15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length
lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order,
§12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table
of implementation limits.
Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new
OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is
ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not
credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so
its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three
vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
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before release (error precedence, trust model, extension order, and rules
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Spec v0.8.2: corrections from the formal review
A formal review of the whole v0.8.2 text found it approvable after
these corrections, recorded in §76 ("Correcciones de la revisión
formal"):
- §27 no longer calls header_binding the authenticity of PUBLIC_HEADER:
it binds the header to the opened control, never authorship or date
(§55.1); the age MAC only protects against whoever lacks the file key.
- §63 steps 9 and 10: a network source (relay, Release API, cache) MUST
verify every response and gives ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE at step 9 when
none verifies; the step-10 codes are for a directly supplied release.
The reference already behaved so; TestReleaseFromANetworkSource pins
both paths.
- §54 and §72: registrations declare the objects and arrays where an
extension may appear, and a known extension out of place counts as
unknown there. The reference gains the optional extension.Placement
interface, used at steps 4, 9.a and 14.
- §63 step 11 fixes the GT serialization hashed by H2 (kilic/kyber order)
with the frozen vector H2(e(G1, G2))[:16] = cb87319f..., shared as
testdata/vectors/tlock_ibe.json; H2-H4 are cited to drand/kyber.
- Step 5 makes the SEALED_CONTROL read mandatory, step 15 names
ERR_HEADER_BINDING, §21 makes capsule_id 16 CSPRNG bytes a MUST, §76
is made accurate (four dk1.json vectors, the §36 time_only rule, two
cases rewritten against the texts that really existed), and editorial
fixes in §5, §36, §55.1, §69.1 and §77. §73 lists the three new
decisions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
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the reference had applied without normative text), amended (the canonical
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Spec v0.8.2: second-round corrections from the formal review
The second round of the formal review confirmed the nine corrections of
c57ed48 and asked for these, recorded in §76 as corrections 4 to 6 and
an editorial note:
- §72: an encoder MUST NOT write a registered extension in an object or
array it is not registered for; §54: a reader MUST NOT interpret the
data of a noncritical one it ignores for that reason. capsule.Encrypt
and accesskey.Encode take no Registry, so the application applies the
rule; their documentation and extension.Placement say so.
- §17 and §51 give the step-10 codes only for a directly supplied
release, as step 10 does; a network source discards a failing one at
step 9.
- Step 9 reports ERR_RELEASE_UNAVAILABLE and no other code, whatever the
failure of the source. provider/drand.Client keeps each relay's failure
as text only (errors.Join made a relay's ERR_ROUND_MISMATCH match with
errors.Is), and capsule.Open keeps only the text of a source error that
carries another code (a caller's source failing with
ERR_RELEASE_INVALID gave that code at step 9). A context that ended
stays detectable: Fetch now has a single failure path, so the canceled
and deadline cases are deterministic.
- TestExtensionPlacement covers the noncritical array of a .dkk: with
the object-blind extension.CheckNoncritical at step 9.a it fails.
- Editorial: §28.1 "analizan solo la cabecera age", one arrow at step 9,
two §76 introductions; §73 lines for release sources and placement.
- testdata/README.md says the corpus registers its extensions in both
arrays of every object; traceability, CHANGELOG and both READMEs
(integrity holds against whoever lacks the file keys, §27, §55.1)
follow. Spec dated 28 September 2026; new SHA-256 in spec/README.md.
No fixture or vector changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
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encoding of BLS12-381 points and the tlock stanza body) and corrected in
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two rounds of a formal review (an invalid release from a network source,
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the objects and arrays where each extension may appear, which an encoder
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must respect, the serialization of GT in the tlock H2, and a single code
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for any failure of a release source), all recorded with their
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reproducible cases in the specification's §76.
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- `DateKeys_Protocol_Specification_v0.9.md`: frozen copy of the normative
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draft v0.9 (29 September 2026), approved by its author on that date and
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tagged `spec-v0.9`; this module implements it. SHA-256:
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`36189e1e62f0f835b7665219aa63df7200cd89ac4e4e924f2705f970fa7c40a9`.
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It adds capsule format 2, which hides until the unlock date the exact
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Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9
The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved
by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only;
Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the
verdict v0.8.2 gave it.
Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39):
- VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other
value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2.
- CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6,
payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and
key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without
extensions, whatever L.
- The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17
checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes.
- INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials,
and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order.
Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the
source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not
canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient);
self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE.
The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format.
Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against
math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats
with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness
by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The
format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the
differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2
fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the
READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
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length of the content (the payload is padded) and the number of
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credentials (always 16 X25519 stanzas), and it makes the writer rules
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normative. A v0.9 reader still opens format 1, the format of v0.8.2. Its
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§76 records each change with its reproducible case.
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Spec v0.10 draft, work in progress (not approved)
Delivery 1 of capsule format 3, as the author decided on 30-09-2026:
several files with their paths, sizes, SHA-256 and dates, encrypted in
the plaintext of PAYLOAD_AGE, and a security area that later versions
will fill with an author signature and a timestamp seal without
changing the format.
- VERSION 3 and CONTROL_CBOR schema 3; writers write only format 3,
readers open the three formats.
- BODY with a 12-byte frame (AREA_LEN, SECURITY_LEN, HEAD_LEN), the
security area fixed by spec version (512 bytes here), the head and
the files (new sections 29.2 to 29.7).
- The head is always version 1 in format 3; path rules R1 to R10 on
pinned Unicode 17.0.0 and WindowsBestFit tables; text rules; the
verdicts X, F0, F1, S0, S1 and S2 and their presentation.
- Step 17 split into 17.1 to 17.8 with its precedence, and the new
code ERR_HEAD_INVALID.
- Atomic delivery of several files (56), limits (57), writer rules 13
to 18, mutation tests, fixtures and the change log in 76.
- The CDDL gains control-v3, security, author-signature, seal, head and
file.
The reference implementation still implements v0.9. The design, its
reviews and the author's decisions are in the private docs repository,
spec_v0.10/formato3_diseno.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
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- `DateKeys_Protocol_Specification_v0.10.md`: working draft v0.10 (30
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September 2026), not yet approved by its author and not implemented. It
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adds capsule format 3, which stores several files with their paths, sizes,
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hashes and dates, encrypted, and reserves the `security` area for an author
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signature and a timestamp seal that later versions will define without
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changing the format. Its §76 records each change with its reproducible case.
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- `datekeys.cddl`: the CBOR schemas of the v0.10 draft, the three control
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versions and the security and head objects of format 3 included, with the
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encoding rules CDDL cannot express. Those of v0.9 and v0.8.2 are at the tags
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`spec-v0.9` and `spec-v0.8.2`.
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Initial implementation of the DateKeys Protocol v0.8.1
Reference implementation in Go, built from the implementation plan
(milestones M0 to M5): datekey, profile, provider, codec, agewrap,
extension, capsule, accesskey, the datekeys CLI, official vectors and
fixtures, the mutation corpus, fuzz targets, interop and live tests,
CI workflows, traceability and policy documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
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The specification is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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International License (CC-BY-4.0): <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>.
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The code of this repository is licensed separately under Apache-2.0.
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Changes to the specification follow its §76: a normative change should answer a
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reproducible case found through the reference implementation, the CDDL, a
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fixture, a mutation test, an interoperability test, fuzzing, a second
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implementation or an external review.
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