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DateKeys/capsule/fuzz_test.go

288 lines
9.9 KiB

package capsule_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
datekeys "g.activething.com/go/DateKeys"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/accesskey"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/capsule"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/datekey"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/extension"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/internal/testkit"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/profile"
)
func seedFixtures(f *testing.F, part func(testkit.Parts) []byte) {
for _, name := range fixtureNames {
b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(fixtureDir, name+".dkc"))
if err != nil {
f.Fatal(err)
}
p, err := testkit.Split(b)
if err != nil {
f.Fatal(err)
}
f.Add(part(p))
}
}
// whole keeps the first 512 bytes of the payload: the pre-unlock checks read
// only its age header, and small inputs keep the fuzzer fast.
func whole(p testkit.Parts) []byte {
payload := p.Payload
if len(payload) > 512 {
payload = payload[:512]
}
return testkit.Join(p.Prelude, p.Header, p.Sealed, payload)
}
func FuzzParsePrelude(f *testing.F) {
seedFixtures(f, func(p testkit.Parts) []byte { return p.Prelude })
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
p, err := capsule.ParsePrelude(b)
if err != nil {
if datekeys.Code(err) == "" {
t.Fatalf("error without a normative code: %v", err)
}
return
}
got := p.Bytes()
if !bytes.Equal(got[:], b[:capsule.PreludeSize]) {
t.Fatal("accepted a prelude that does not re-encode to its input")
}
})
}
func FuzzDecodeHeader(f *testing.F) {
seedFixtures(f, func(p testkit.Parts) []byte { return p.Header })
// access_policy in a multi-byte head whose low byte is a V1 policy: a
// narrowing before the check accepted them (spec §25).
dk := datekey.DateKey{ProfileID: profile.QuicknetID, Round: 1000}.Compact()
for _, p := range []uint64{256, 257, 1 << 32} {
h, err := testkit.RawHeader([capsule.CapsuleIDSize]byte{1}, dk, p)
if err != nil {
f.Fatal(err)
}
f.Add(h)
}
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
h, err := capsule.DecodeHeader(b)
if err != nil {
if datekeys.Code(err) == "" {
t.Fatalf("error without a normative code: %v", err)
}
return
}
re, err := capsule.EncodeHeader(h)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(re, b) {
t.Fatal("accepted a PUBLIC_HEADER that does not re-encode to its input")
}
})
}
func FuzzDecodeControl(f *testing.F) {
for _, name := range fixtureNames {
fx := loadFixture(f, name)
b, _ := hexDecode(fx.ControlCBOR)
f.Add(b)
}
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// The same bytes as the control of a capsule of each format: at most
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// one of the three schema versions accepts them.
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
accepted := 0
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
for _, format := range []capsule.Format{capsule.Format1, capsule.Format2, capsule.Format3} {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
c, err := capsule.DecodeControl(b, format)
if err != nil {
if datekeys.Code(err) == "" {
t.Fatalf("format %d: error without a normative code: %v", format, err)
}
continue
}
accepted++
re, err := capsule.EncodeControl(c, format)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(re, b) {
t.Fatalf("format %d: accepted a CONTROL_CBOR that does not re-encode to its input", format)
}
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if accepted > 1 {
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
t.Fatal("two formats accept the same CONTROL_CBOR")
}
})
}
// FuzzDecodeHead: a head that DecodeHead accepts re-encodes to its input,
// and each rejection carries exactly one normative code (spec §29.4, §69.1).
func FuzzDecodeHead(f *testing.F) {
for _, name := range fixtureNames {
if fx := loadFixture(f, name); fx.Head != "" {
b, _ := hexDecode(fx.Head)
f.Add(b)
}
}
var heads testkit.HeadSchemaFile
if err := testkit.ReadJSON("../testdata/vectors/head_schema.json", &heads); err != nil {
f.Fatal(err)
}
for _, v := range heads.Heads {
b, _ := hexDecode(v.Hex)
f.Add(b)
}
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
h, err := capsule.DecodeHead(b, nil)
if err != nil {
if n := codes(err); n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%d normative codes: %v", n, err)
}
return
}
if re, err := capsule.EncodeHead(h); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(re, b) {
t.Fatalf("accepted a head that does not re-encode to its input: %v", err)
}
})
}
// FuzzEvaluateSecurity: security never fails, and gives verdicts of this
// version, X for both the signature and the seal or for neither (spec §29.3,
// §29.7).
func FuzzEvaluateSecurity(f *testing.F) {
for _, name := range fixtureNames {
if fx := loadFixture(f, name); fx.Security != "" {
b, _ := hexDecode(fx.Security)
f.Add(b)
}
}
var security testkit.SecurityVectorFile
if err := testkit.ReadJSON("../testdata/vectors/security.json", &security); err != nil {
f.Fatal(err)
}
for _, v := range security.Vectors {
b, _ := hexDecode(v.Hex)
f.Add(b)
}
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
v := capsule.EvaluateSecurity(b)
switch {
case v.Signature != capsule.VerdictUnreadable && v.Signature != capsule.VerdictNoSignature && v.Signature != capsule.VerdictSignatureUnchecked,
v.Seal != capsule.VerdictUnreadable && v.Seal != capsule.VerdictNoSeal && v.Seal != capsule.VerdictSealUnsupported && v.Seal != capsule.VerdictSealUnreadable,
(v.Signature == capsule.VerdictUnreadable) != (v.Seal == capsule.VerdictUnreadable),
len(v.Lines()) == 0:
t.Fatalf("verdicts %+v", v)
}
})
}
// FuzzInspect feeds whole capsules to the pre-unlock validation, and to Open
// with a source that never has the release: a capsule that Inspect rejects
// must not cause a request, and nothing may pass the release step. The
// cryptographic steps after it are exercised by the mutation corpus; keeping
// them out of this target keeps it fast.
func FuzzInspect(f *testing.F) {
seedFixtures(f, whole)
reg := testkit.Registry()
far := testkit.Fixed(testkit.Genesis().AddDate(5, 0, 0))
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
_, err := capsule.Inspect(bytes.NewReader(b), capsule.InspectOptions{Registry: reg})
if err != nil && datekeys.Code(err) == "" {
t.Fatalf("error without a normative code: %v", err)
}
src := testkit.NewSource()
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
o := capsule.OpenOptions{Registry: reg, Source: src, Now: far, Sink: testkit.DiscardSink{}}
_, openErr := capsule.Open(context.Background(), io.Discard, bytes.NewReader(b), o)
switch {
case openErr == nil:
t.Fatal("opened without a release")
case datekeys.Code(openErr) == "":
t.Fatalf("error without a normative code: %v", openErr)
case err != nil && src.Calls != 0:
t.Fatal("a capsule rejected by Inspect caused a release request")
case err == nil && !errors.Is(openErr, datekeys.ErrReleaseUnavailable) && !errors.Is(openErr, datekeys.ErrAccessRequired):
t.Fatalf("a capsule accepted by Inspect failed before the release step: %v", openErr)
}
})
}
// FuzzEncodeImpliesDecode: whatever EncodeHeader, EncodeControl and
// accesskey.Encode accept, the matching decoder accepts and re-encodes to the
// same bytes. An encoder that writes what its reader rejects makes capsules
// that cannot be opened (spec §72, §76 case 5).
func FuzzEncodeImpliesDecode(f *testing.F) {
f.Add("org.example.label", uint64(1), []byte("public label"), "org.example.note", uint64(2), []byte{0xa2, 0x00, 0x07}, uint8(0), uint8(0))
f.Add("a", uint64(1)<<32, []byte{}, "a", uint64(0), []byte{0x81, 0x81, 0x00}, uint8(0b1011), uint8(63))
f.Add("org.\xff", uint64(0), []byte{0xf6}, "z", uint64(1)<<53, []byte(nil), uint8(0b0100), uint8(64))
dk := datekey.DateKey{ProfileID: profile.QuicknetID, Round: 1000}
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, id1 string, v1 uint64, d1 []byte, id2 string, v2 uint64, d2 []byte, mode, filler uint8) {
// mode bit 0: first extension critical; bit 1: second critical;
// bit 2: first without data; bit 3: second without data. filler
// adds extensions to the noncritical array, up to past the limit.
e1 := extension.Extension{ID: id1, Version: v1, Data: d1}
e2 := extension.Extension{ID: id2, Version: v2, Data: d2}
if mode&4 != 0 {
e1.Data = nil
}
if mode&8 != 0 {
e2.Data = nil
}
var crit, non []extension.Extension
for i, e := range []extension.Extension{e1, e2} {
if mode&(1<<i) != 0 {
crit = append(crit, e)
} else {
non = append(non, e)
}
}
for i := range int(filler % 72) {
non = append(non, extension.Extension{ID: fmt.Sprintf("x.%02d", i), Version: 1})
}
h := &capsule.Header{DateKey: dk, Policy: capsule.Policy(mode >> 4 & 1), Critical: crit, Noncritical: non}
if b, err := capsule.EncodeHeader(h); err == nil {
back, err := capsule.DecodeHeader(b)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EncodeHeader wrote a PUBLIC_HEADER that DecodeHeader rejects: %v", err)
}
if re, err := capsule.EncodeHeader(back); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(re, b) {
t.Fatal("PUBLIC_HEADER does not re-encode to itself")
}
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// mode bits 5 and 6: the padding code of the format 2 control, from 0
// to 3; v2 is its payload_length, possibly above L_MAX.
for _, format := range []capsule.Format{capsule.Format1, capsule.Format2} {
c := &capsule.Control{Critical: crit, Noncritical: non}
if format == capsule.Format2 {
c.PayloadLength, c.Padding = v2, capsule.Padding(mode>>5&3)
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if b, err := capsule.EncodeControl(c, format); err == nil {
back, err := capsule.DecodeControl(b, format)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EncodeControl wrote a format %d CONTROL_CBOR that DecodeControl rejects: %v", format, err)
}
if re, err := capsule.EncodeControl(back, format); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(re, b) {
t.Fatalf("format %d CONTROL_CBOR does not re-encode to itself", format)
}
}
}
k := &accesskey.AccessKey{Type: accesskey.TypeX25519, Material: make([]byte, 32), Critical: crit, Noncritical: non}
var dkk bytes.Buffer
if err := accesskey.Encode(&dkk, k); err == nil {
back, err := accesskey.Decode(bytes.NewReader(dkk.Bytes()))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("accesskey.Encode wrote a .dkk that Decode rejects: %v", err)
}
var re bytes.Buffer
if err := accesskey.Encode(&re, back); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(re.Bytes(), dkk.Bytes()) {
t.Fatal(".dkk does not re-encode to itself")
}
}
})
}
func hexDecode(s string) ([]byte, error) { return hex.DecodeString(s) }

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