You can not select more than 25 topics Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
DateKeys/capsule/trust_test.go

136 lines
4.8 KiB

Spec v0.8.2 refinements: error precedence, trust model, strict order Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the §76 v0.8.2 subsection: - §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8. - §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory. - §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness). - Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers, §15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order, §12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table of implementation limits. Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
package capsule_test
import (
"bytes"
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
datekeys "g.activething.com/go/DateKeys"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/accesskey"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/agewrap"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/capsule"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/extension"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/internal/testkit"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/profile"
)
// Spec §55.1: what each section proves, and what it never proves.
func TestTrustModel(t *testing.T) {
// PUBLIC_HEADER never proves authorship: from the public bytes of
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// time_only.dkc, or of format2_time_only.dkc, anyone builds a capsule
// with the same PRELUDE, the same PUBLIC_HEADER and another plaintext,
// which passes all 18 steps (spec §36.1).
for _, c := range []struct {
fixture string
format capsule.Format
}{{"time_only", capsule.Format1}, {"format2_time_only", capsule.Format2}} {
g := loadFixture(t, c.fixture)
p, _ := parts(t, c.fixture)
rec, err := agewrap.NewTimeRecipient(profile.Quicknet(), 1000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
payloadID, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
raw, err := agewrap.RawX25519Identity(payloadID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
content := []byte("forged")
ctrl := &capsule.Control{}
plaintext := content
if c.format == capsule.Format2 {
ctrl.PayloadLength, ctrl.Padding = uint64(len(content)), capsule.Reforzado
plaintext = append(bytes.Clone(content), make([]byte, 256-len(content))...)
}
payload, _, err := testkit.Encrypt(plaintext, payloadID.Recipient())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
draft, err := capsule.EncodeControl(ctrl, c.format)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sealedDraft, _, err := testkit.Encrypt(draft, rec)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
prelude := capsule.Prelude{Format: c.format, PublicHeaderLen: uint32(len(p.Header)), SealedControlLen: uint32(len(sealedDraft))}.Bytes()
ctrl.HeaderBinding = capsule.HeaderBinding(prelude, p.Header)
copy(ctrl.PayloadIdentity[:], raw)
control, err := capsule.EncodeControl(ctrl, c.format)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sealed, _, err := testkit.Encrypt(control, rec)
if err != nil || len(sealed) != len(sealedDraft) {
t.Fatalf("sealing: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(prelude[:], p.Prelude) {
t.Fatalf("%s: PRELUDE %x differs from the official %x", c.fixture, prelude, p.Prelude)
}
forged := testkit.Join(prelude[:], p.Header, sealed, payload)
if got, err := open(t, forged, g.openOptions(t)); err != nil || string(got) != "forged" {
t.Fatalf("%s: forged capsule: %q, %v", c.fixture, got, err)
}
Spec v0.8.2 refinements: error precedence, trust model, strict order Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the §76 v0.8.2 subsection: - §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8. - §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory. - §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness). - Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers, §15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order, §12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table of implementation limits. Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// In format 2 the control fixes the length and the padding of the
// plaintext, not the original L: whoever can seal another control, as
// anyone can for time_only once the round is published, declares another
// L with the same P, here L + 1 over a padding byte that is zero, and the
// capsule opens to another content (spec §30.1, §55.1).
x, err := testkit.LoadFixture(fixtureDir, "format2_time_only_extensions")
Spec v0.8.2 refinements: error precedence, trust model, strict order Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the §76 v0.8.2 subsection: - §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8. - §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory. - §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness). - Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers, §15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order, §12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table of implementation limits. Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
longer, err := x.WithControl(func(m map[uint64]any) { m[6] = payloadLength(x.PayloadLength + 1) })
Spec v0.8.2 refinements: error precedence, trust model, strict order Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the §76 v0.8.2 subsection: - §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8. - §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory. - §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness). - Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers, §15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order, §12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table of implementation limits. Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
xf := loadFixture(t, "format2_time_only_extensions")
if got, err := open(t, longer.DKC, xf.openOptions(t)); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got, append(bytes.Clone(xf.plaintext), 0)) {
t.Fatalf("control with L + 1: %q, %v", got, err)
Spec v0.8.2 refinements: error precedence, trust model, strict order Approved refinements, each recorded with its reproducible case in the §76 v0.8.2 subsection: - §69.1: layered error model with normative precedence (frame, type tag and version, CBOR profile and CDDL, then fields with their own code in ascending key order; across steps the §63 order decides), with a scope paragraph for the optional steps 5, 6 and 8. - §55.1: normative trust table per section (who can write it, from which step it is bound, what it never proves); §72: security-relevant claims go in CONTROL_CBOR or under a signature, .dkk data is advisory. - §31/§54: extension arrays in strictly ascending unsigned byte order of extension_id (one rule for order and uniqueness). - Gaps a second implementation needed: §28.1 malformed age headers, §15/§19 latest unlock time and dk1_ reading rules, §22/§23/§57 length lower bounds, §63 step 8 tlock argument comparison and step 9 order, §12.1 profile validation with the drand chain-hash formula, §74 table of implementation limits. Reference alignment: .dkk errors only at step 9.a (new OpenOptions.AccessKeyFile, used by the CLI), CR/LF in dk1_ is ERR_DATEKEY_INVALID, BODY_LEN 0 is ERR_INTEGRITY, nil identities are not credentials, and AccessIdentity tries every identity on every stanza so its verdict does not depend on their order. dk1.json gains three vectors; every other testdata file is byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 weeks ago
}
// PUBLIC_HEADER is bound from step 15 only: other extension data passes
// steps 1 to 8 and fails header_binding.
e := loadFixture(t, "time_only_extensions")
ep, err := testkit.Split(e.dkc)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
header := bytes.Replace(ep.Header, []byte("public label"), []byte("Public label"), 1)
if bytes.Equal(header, ep.Header) {
t.Fatal("the header data was not found")
}
edited := testkit.Join(ep.Prelude, header, ep.Sealed, ep.Payload)
if step, err := inspectStep(t, edited, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("steps 1 to 8 rejected the edited header data at step %d: %v", step, err)
}
step, _, err := openStep(t, edited, capsule.OpenOptions{Now: testkit.Fixed(e.unlock(t))})
expectStep(t, "PUBLIC_HEADER data edited", step, err, datekeys.ErrHeaderBinding, 15)
// The data of .dkk extensions is bound to nothing: other data opens the
// capsule all the same (spec §72: advisory for its holder only).
f := loadFixture(t, "time_and_key_portable")
k := loadAccessKey(t, "time_and_key_portable_extension")
k.Noncritical = []extension.Extension{mustExt(t, "org.example.delivery", []byte("anything else"))}
var dkk bytes.Buffer
if err := accesskey.Encode(&dkk, k); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
back, err := accesskey.Decode(&dkk)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
o := f.openOptions(t)
o.AccessKey = back
if got, err := open(t, f.dkc, o); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got, f.plaintext) {
t.Fatalf(".dkk with other extension data: %v", err)
}
}

Powered by TurnKey Linux.