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DateKeys/capsule/conformance_test.go

498 lines
18 KiB

package capsule_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
"errors"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"slices"
"testing"
"time"
"filippo.io/age"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/accesskey"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/agewrap"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/capsule"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/extension"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/internal/testkit"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/profile"
"g.activething.com/go/DateKeys/provider"
)
const fixtureDir = "../testdata/fixtures"
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// fixtureNames are the official fixtures: the format 1 ones of spec v0.8.2,
// kept for compatibility, and the format 2 ones (spec §67).
var fixtureNames = []string{
"time_only", "time_only_extensions", "time_and_key_portable", "time_and_key_recipients", "empty_payload",
"format2_time_only", "format2_time_only_bloque256", "format2_empty_payload", "format2_time_only_extensions",
"format2_time_and_key_portable", "format2_time_and_key_recipients", "format2_time_and_key_sixteen",
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
"format3_single", "format3_tree", "format3_comment_only", "format3_bloque256", "format3_time_and_key_portable",
"format3_area_1024", "format3_security_v2", "format3_signature_unsupported", "format3_seal_unsupported",
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
}
type fixture struct {
testkit.DKCFixture
dkc []byte
plaintext []byte
release provider.Release
dkk *accesskey.AccessKey
ids []age.Identity
}
func loadFixture(t testing.TB, name string) *fixture {
t.Helper()
f := &fixture{}
if err := testkit.ReadJSON(filepath.Join(fixtureDir, name+".json"), &f.DKCFixture); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var err error
if f.dkc, err = os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(fixtureDir, f.File)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if f.plaintext, err = os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(fixtureDir, f.PlaintextFile)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sig, err := hex.DecodeString(f.Release.Signature)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f.release = provider.Release{Round: f.Release.Round, Signature: sig}
if f.AccessKeyFile != "" {
b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(fixtureDir, f.AccessKeyFile))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if f.dkk, err = accesskey.Decode(bytes.NewReader(b)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
for _, s := range f.Identities {
id, err := age.ParseX25519Identity(s)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f.ids = append(f.ids, id)
}
return f
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
func (f *fixture) format() capsule.Format { return capsule.Format(f.Format) }
// slots is the number of INNER_ACCESS_AGE stanzas of the format of f, 0
// meaning one or more.
func (f *fixture) slots() int {
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if f.format() != capsule.Format1 {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
return agewrap.AccessSlots
}
return 0
}
func (f *fixture) unlock(t testing.TB) time.Time {
u, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, f.UnlockAt)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return u
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// openOptions returns the options that open f: its release, its unlock time
// and, for time_and_key, its .dkk or else its identities.
func (f *fixture) openOptions(t testing.TB) capsule.OpenOptions {
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
o := capsule.OpenOptions{Registry: testkit.Registry(), Source: testkit.NewSource(f.release), Now: testkit.Fixed(f.unlock(t)), Sink: testkit.DiscardSink{}}
if f.AccessPolicy == "time_and_key" {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if f.dkk != nil {
o.AccessKey = f.dkk
} else {
o.Identities = f.ids
}
}
return o
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// credentials returns the identities that open INNER_ACCESS_AGE: the .dkk
// first, when there is one, then the identities of the record.
func (f *fixture) credentials(t testing.TB) []age.Identity {
var ids []age.Identity
if f.dkk != nil {
id, err := f.dkk.Identity()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ids = append(ids, id)
}
return append(ids, f.ids...)
}
func decryptAge(t *testing.T, file []byte, id age.Identity) []byte {
t.Helper()
r, err := age.Decrypt(bytes.NewReader(file), id)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
b, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return b
}
func stanzaList(in []capsule.StanzaInfo) []testkit.FixtureStanza {
out := make([]testkit.FixtureStanza, len(in))
for i, s := range in {
out[i] = testkit.FixtureStanza{Type: s.Type, Args: s.Args}
}
return out
}
// Spec §67: conformance is shown by decrypting and verifying each official
// fixture and comparing every intermediate value and the plaintext.
func TestConformanceFixtures(t *testing.T) {
p := profile.Quicknet()
for _, name := range fixtureNames {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := loadFixture(t, name)
if sum := sha256.Sum256(f.dkc); hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) != f.SHA256 {
t.Fatal("fixture bytes changed")
}
if sum := sha256.Sum256(f.plaintext); hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) != f.PlaintextSHA256 {
t.Fatal("plaintext file changed")
}
if err := provider.Verify(p, provider.Condition{Round: f.release.Round}, f.release); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("embedded release: %v", err)
}
// PRELUDE, PUBLIC_HEADER and the pre-unlock view (steps 1 to 8).
parts, err := testkit.Split(f.dkc)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hex.EncodeToString(parts.Prelude) != f.Prelude || hex.EncodeToString(parts.Header) != f.PublicHeader {
t.Fatal("PRELUDE or PUBLIC_HEADER differ")
}
in, err := capsule.Inspect(bytes.NewReader(f.dkc), capsule.InspectOptions{Registry: testkit.Registry()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if in.Prelude.Format != f.format() || in.Header.DateKey.Compact() != f.DateKey || in.Header.CapsuleIDHex() != f.CapsuleID ||
in.Header.Policy.String() != f.AccessPolicy || in.UnlockAt.Format(time.RFC3339) != f.UnlockAt {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
t.Fatalf("inspection differs: format %d, %+v", in.Prelude.Format, in.Header)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(stanzaList(in.OuterStanzas), f.OuterStanzas) || !reflect.DeepEqual(stanzaList(in.PayloadStanzas), f.PayloadStanzas) {
t.Fatal("stanzas differ")
}
for _, c := range in.Checks {
if !c.OK || c.Step > 8 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected inspection check %+v", c)
}
}
var pre [capsule.PreludeSize]byte
copy(pre[:], parts.Prelude)
if b := capsule.HeaderBinding(pre, parts.Header); hex.EncodeToString(b[:]) != f.HeaderBinding {
t.Fatal("header_binding differs")
}
h, err := capsule.DecodeHeader(parts.Header)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if re, _ := capsule.EncodeHeader(h); !bytes.Equal(re, parts.Header) {
t.Fatal("EncodeHeader(DecodeHeader(x)) != x")
}
if got := fixtureExts(h.Critical, h.Noncritical); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, f.HeaderExtensions) {
t.Fatalf("header extensions differ:\n got %+v\nwant %+v", got, f.HeaderExtensions)
}
// Opening layer by layer: OUTER_TIME_AGE, INNER_ACCESS_AGE, CONTROL_CBOR.
timeID, _ := agewrap.NewTimeIdentity(p, f.release.Round, f.release)
inner := decryptAge(t, parts.Sealed, timeID)
control := inner
if f.Structure == "time_and_key" {
st, err := agewrap.Stanzas(bytes.NewReader(inner))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got := make([]testkit.FixtureStanza, len(st))
for i, s := range st {
got[i] = testkit.FixtureStanza{Type: s.Type, Args: s.Args}
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, f.InnerStanzas) {
t.Fatal("INNER_ACCESS_AGE stanzas differ")
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if err := agewrap.CheckAccessStanzas(st, f.slots()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if f.format() != capsule.Format1 {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
checkCredentialStanzas(t, f, st)
}
acc, _ := agewrap.NewAccessIdentity(f.slots(), f.credentials(t)[0])
control = decryptAge(t, inner, acc)
}
if hex.EncodeToString(control) != f.ControlCBOR {
t.Fatal("CONTROL_CBOR differs")
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
ctrl, err := capsule.DecodeControl(control, f.format())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hex.EncodeToString(ctrl.PayloadIdentity[:]) != f.PayloadIdentity || hex.EncodeToString(ctrl.HeaderBinding[:]) != f.HeaderBinding {
t.Fatal("I_PAYLOAD or header_binding in CONTROL_CBOR differ")
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if re, _ := capsule.EncodeControl(ctrl, f.format()); !bytes.Equal(re, control) {
t.Fatal("EncodeControl(DecodeControl(x)) != x")
}
if got := fixtureExts(ctrl.Critical, ctrl.Noncritical); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, f.ControlExt) {
t.Fatalf("control extensions differ:\n got %+v\nwant %+v", got, f.ControlExt)
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// PAYLOAD_AGE: the content, BODY in format 3, and in formats 2 and 3
// its padding (spec §29.1, §29.2).
payloadID, _ := agewrap.NewPayloadIdentity(ctrl.PayloadIdentity[:])
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
plaintext := decryptAge(t, parts.Payload, payloadID)
if f.PayloadLength != uint64(len(f.plaintext)) {
t.Fatalf("payload_length %d, the content is %d bytes", f.PayloadLength, len(f.plaintext))
}
switch f.format() {
case capsule.Format1:
if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, f.plaintext) || ctrl.PayloadLength != 0 || ctrl.Padding != 0 || f.Padding != 0 || f.PaddedLength != 0 {
t.Fatal("PAYLOAD_AGE plaintext differs")
}
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
case capsule.Format2, capsule.Format3:
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
padded, err := capsule.PaddedLength(f.PayloadLength, capsule.Padding(f.Padding))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ctrl.PayloadLength != f.PayloadLength || ctrl.Padding != capsule.Padding(f.Padding) || padded != f.PaddedLength ||
uint64(len(plaintext)) != padded || !bytes.Equal(plaintext[:f.PayloadLength], f.plaintext) ||
len(bytes.Trim(plaintext[f.PayloadLength:], "\x00")) != 0 {
t.Fatal("PAYLOAD_AGE plaintext is not the content and its padding")
}
if n := uint64(len(parts.Payload)); n != capsule.PayloadAgeLength(padded) {
t.Fatalf("PAYLOAD_AGE of %d bytes, P = %d gives %d", n, padded, capsule.PayloadAgeLength(padded))
}
}
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if f.format() == capsule.Format3 {
checkBody3(t, f)
}
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// The complete flow through the public API, stage by stage: the
// content, or in format 3 the files, the head and the verdicts.
var out bytes.Buffer
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
o := f.openOptions(t)
sink := &testkit.MemorySink{}
o.Sink = sink
opened, err := capsule.Open(context.Background(), &out, bytes.NewReader(f.dkc), o)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if f.format() == capsule.Format3 {
if out.Len() != 0 || !sink.Committed || len(sink.Files) != len(f.Files) {
t.Fatal("Open did not deliver the files to the Sink")
}
for i, r := range f.Files {
if !bytes.Equal(sink.Files[i], f.plaintext[f.ContentOffset+r.Start:f.ContentOffset+r.End]) {
t.Fatalf("file %q differs", r.Path)
}
}
v := opened.Verdicts
if string(v.Signature) != f.Verdicts.Signature || string(v.Seal) != f.Verdicts.Seal || opened.AreaLen != f.AreaLen ||
opened.Head.Comment != f.Comment || opened.Head.Author != f.Author || hex.EncodeToString(opened.Head.Salt[:]) != f.Salt {
t.Fatalf("Open reports another head or verdicts: %+v", v)
}
} else if !bytes.Equal(out.Bytes(), f.plaintext) {
t.Fatal("plaintext differs")
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
if opened.Format != f.format() || opened.PayloadLength != f.PayloadLength ||
opened.Padding != capsule.Padding(f.Padding) || opened.PaddedLength != f.PaddedLength {
t.Fatalf("Open reports format %d, L = %d, padding %d, P = %d", opened.Format, opened.PayloadLength, opened.Padding, opened.PaddedLength)
}
var stages []testkit.FixtureStage
for _, c := range opened.Inspection.Checks {
stages = append(stages, testkit.FixtureStage{Step: c.Step, Name: c.Name, OK: c.OK, Error: c.Error})
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(stages, f.Stages) {
t.Fatalf("stages differ:\n got %+v\nwant %+v", stages, f.Stages)
}
if got := fixtureExts(opened.ControlCritical, opened.ControlNoncritical); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, f.ControlExt) {
t.Fatal("Open does not report the control extensions")
}
})
}
}
Format 3, step 6b: the nine fixtures of format 3 The fixtures of spec 67 for format 3, each with its record, its BODY, its inspect output and, for time_and_key, its .dkk: - format3_single, format3_tree (five files in three folders, one over two STREAM chunks, one without mtime, a comment and a declared author), format3_comment_only (no files; a TAB in the comment), format3_bloque256 and format3_time_and_key_portable, written with EncryptFiles; - format3_area_1024, format3_security_v2 (verdict X), format3_signature_unsupported (an author-signature of alg 1 with a random key of 32 bytes and a random signature of 64: F1) and format3_seal_unsupported (that and a seal of seal_type 1: F1 and S1), which only a generator of test vectors writes (62.1 rule 13), built with testkit.Build. The record of a format 3 fixture adds the area, SECURITY_CBOR, HEAD_CBOR, the salt, the comment, the declared author, the head extensions, the offset of CONTENT in BODY, each file with its layout, SHA-256 and mtime, and the verdicts with their lines; its plaintext file is BODY. The generator writes, then recovers every value by opening layer by layer for the three formats alike, and refreshes the records of format 3 through a Sink. Tests: the conformance test checks BODY, the head, security and every file, and opens through a MemorySink; the .dkk tests take the .dkk of formats 2 and 3 too (spec 68); the CLI decrypts five of the fixtures into folders; the control fuzz target decodes with the three schema versions. The differential corpus gains two bases, format3_single and format3_time_and_key_portable, one per policy: 5110 cases, the earlier ones unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// checkBody3 checks BODY, the plaintext file of a format 3 fixture, against
// its record: the frame, the area, security and its verdicts, the head and
// each file with its SHA-256 (spec §29.2 to §29.7).
func checkBody3(t *testing.T, f *fixture) {
t.Helper()
body := f.plaintext
l := uint64(len(body))
frame, err := capsule.ParseBodyFrame(body[:capsule.BodyFrameSize], l)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
area := body[capsule.BodyFrameSize : capsule.BodyFrameSize+uint64(frame.AreaLen)]
if err := capsule.CheckArea(area, frame.SecurityLen); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
security := area[:frame.SecurityLen]
offset := capsule.BodyFrameSize + uint64(frame.AreaLen) + uint64(frame.HeadLen)
hb := body[capsule.BodyFrameSize+uint64(frame.AreaLen) : offset]
if frame.AreaLen != f.AreaLen || hex.EncodeToString(security) != f.Security || hex.EncodeToString(hb) != f.Head || offset != f.ContentOffset {
t.Fatal("the area, security, the head or the offset of CONTENT differ")
}
v := capsule.EvaluateSecurity(security)
if f.Verdicts == nil || string(v.Signature) != f.Verdicts.Signature || string(v.Seal) != f.Verdicts.Seal || !reflect.DeepEqual(v.Lines(), f.Verdicts.Lines) {
t.Fatalf("verdicts %+v, recorded %+v", v, f.Verdicts)
}
h, err := capsule.DecodeHead(hb, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if re, _ := capsule.EncodeHead(h); !bytes.Equal(re, hb) {
t.Fatal("EncodeHead(DecodeHead(x)) != x")
}
if err := capsule.CheckHeadEnd(h, frame.ContentLength(l)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hex.EncodeToString(h.Salt[:]) != f.Salt || h.Comment != f.Comment || h.Author != f.Author || len(h.Files) != len(f.Files) {
t.Fatal("the head differs from the record")
}
if got := fixtureExts(h.Critical, h.Noncritical); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, f.HeadExtensions) {
t.Fatalf("head extensions differ:\n got %+v\nwant %+v", got, f.HeadExtensions)
}
for i, e := range h.Files {
r := f.Files[i]
recorded := r.MTime != nil
if e.Path != r.Path || e.Size != r.Size || e.Start != r.Start || e.End != r.End || hex.EncodeToString(e.SHA256[:]) != r.SHA256 ||
e.HasMTime != recorded || recorded && e.MTime != *r.MTime {
t.Fatalf("file %d: %+v, recorded %+v", i+1, e, r)
}
if sha256.Sum256(body[offset+e.Start:offset+e.End]) != e.SHA256 {
t.Fatalf("file %q: its bytes do not have its SHA-256", e.Path)
}
}
}
// checkCredentialStanzas checks the record of a time_and_key fixture of
// format 2 or 3: each credential opens exactly the stanza the record gives, and no
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// credential opens any other one, which are the dummies (spec §39, §67).
func checkCredentialStanzas(t *testing.T, f *fixture, st []*age.Stanza) {
t.Helper()
want := slices.Clone(f.IdentityStanzas)
if f.dkk != nil {
if f.AccessKeyStanza == nil {
t.Fatal("no access_key_stanza for the .dkk")
}
want = append([]int{*f.AccessKeyStanza}, want...)
}
creds := f.credentials(t)
if len(creds) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("%d credentials, %d recorded stanzas", len(creds), len(want))
}
opened := map[int]bool{}
for c, id := range creds {
for i, s := range st {
fk, err := id.Unwrap([]*age.Stanza{s})
if errors.Is(err, age.ErrIncorrectIdentity) {
continue
}
if err != nil || i != want[c] || opened[i] {
t.Fatalf("credential %d opens stanza %d, recorded %d: %v", c, i, want[c], err)
}
opened[i] = true
clear(fk)
}
}
if len(opened) != len(creds) {
t.Fatalf("%d credentials open %d stanzas", len(creds), len(opened))
}
}
// fixtureExts lists extensions as the fixtures record them, with the exact
// data bytes (spec §67, §68).
func fixtureExts(critical, noncritical []extension.Extension) []testkit.FixtureExt {
var out []testkit.FixtureExt
for i, e := range append(slices.Clone(critical), noncritical...) {
out = append(out, testkit.FixtureExt{Critical: i < len(critical), ID: e.ID, Version: e.Version, Data: hex.EncodeToString(e.Data)})
}
return out
}
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
// The extension data of time_only_extensions and format2_time_only_extensions,
// restated independently of their JSON: raw UTF-8 bytes in PUBLIC_HEADER, and
// CBOR in the profile of spec §58 in CONTROL_CBOR. The base protocol decodes
// neither.
func TestExtensionFixtureData(t *testing.T) {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
for _, name := range []string{"time_only_extensions", "format2_time_only_extensions"} {
f := loadFixture(t, name)
var out bytes.Buffer
opened, err := capsule.Open(context.Background(), &out, bytes.NewReader(f.dkc), f.openOptions(t))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
h := opened.Inspection.Header
if len(h.Critical) != 0 || len(h.Noncritical) != 1 || h.Noncritical[0].ID != "org.example.label" || h.Noncritical[0].Version != 1 ||
string(h.Noncritical[0].Data) != "public label" {
t.Fatalf("%s: header extension %+v", name, h.Noncritical)
}
c := opened.ControlNoncritical
if len(opened.ControlCritical) != 0 || len(c) != 1 || c[0].ID != "org.example.note" || c[0].Version != 2 ||
hex.EncodeToString(c[0].Data) != "a2000701667365616c6564" {
t.Fatalf("%s: control extension %+v", name, c)
}
}
}
func loadAccessKey(t *testing.T, name string) *accesskey.AccessKey {
t.Helper()
b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(fixtureDir, name+".dkk"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
k, err := accesskey.Decode(bytes.NewReader(b))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return k
}
// Every known recipient of a multi-recipient fixture opens it on its own.
func TestFixtureRecipients(t *testing.T) {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
for _, c := range []struct {
name string
n int
}{{"time_and_key_recipients", 2}, {"format2_time_and_key_recipients", 3}, {"format2_time_and_key_sixteen", 16}} {
f := loadFixture(t, c.name)
if len(f.ids) != c.n {
t.Fatalf("%s should have %d known recipients", c.name, c.n)
}
for i, id := range f.ids {
o := f.openOptions(t)
o.AccessKey = nil
o.Identities = []age.Identity{id}
var out bytes.Buffer
if _, err := capsule.Open(context.Background(), &out, bytes.NewReader(f.dkc), o); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(out.Bytes(), f.plaintext) {
t.Fatalf("%s, recipient %d: %v", c.name, i, err)
}
}
}
}
// A non-seekable reader works too: only the capsule_digest shortcut is skipped.
func TestOpenFromPlainReader(t *testing.T) {
Implement capsule format 2 of spec v0.9 The reference moves to the DateKeys Protocol Specification v0.9, approved by its author on 29 September 2026. Encrypt writes capsule format 2 only; Open and Inspect read formats 1 and 2, and a format 1 capsule keeps the verdict v0.8.2 gave it. Format 2 (spec §22, §29.1, §31, §39): - VERSION in the PRELUDE is the capsule format, capsule.Format; any other value is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION at step 2. - CONTROL_CBOR has the schema version of its format. Version 2 adds key 6, payload_length (8 bytes, big-endian, at most L_MAX = 2^53 - 2^46), and key 7, padding (1 bloque256, 2 reforzado); it is 103 bytes without extensions, whatever L. - The payload is the content padded with zeros to P = rule(L). Step 17 checks the length and the zeros, and Open writes only the first L bytes. - INNER_ACCESS_AGE holds exactly 16 X25519 stanzas: 1 to 16 credentials, and a dummy in each slot left, in a uniformly random order. Writer rules (spec §62.1): EncryptOptions.Length is required and the source must deliver exactly that many bytes; recipients that are not canonical or of low order are rejected (agewrap.CheckX25519Recipient); self-checks of the header, the control, INNER_ACCESS_AGE and PAYLOAD_AGE. The CLI measures its input, takes -padding and reports the format. Test data: seven format 2 fixtures, padding vectors checked against math/big, format 2 CBOR vectors, and the mutation corpus in both formats with the 22 cases of the third list of spec §64, built without randomness by sealing the fixtures again with their known keys and nonces. The format 1 fixtures are kept byte for byte and never regenerated; the differential corpus keeps its 1825 cases and adds a block per format 2 fixture. The spec copy loses its "to be implemented" markers, and the READMEs, CHANGELOG, traceability and testdata/README.md follow v0.9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
for _, name := range []string{"time_only", "time_and_key_portable", "format2_time_only", "format2_time_and_key_portable"} {
f := loadFixture(t, name)
var out bytes.Buffer
r := struct{ io.Reader }{bytes.NewReader(f.dkc)}
if _, err := capsule.Open(context.Background(), &out, r, f.openOptions(t)); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(out.Bytes(), f.plaintext) {
t.Fatalf("%s: %v", name, err)
}
}
}

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