Phase 2, step 8: the open action of /inspect
After steps 1 to 8, a valid capsule whose date has passed on the device
clock can be opened in the page: steps 9 to 18 of spec section 63 with
open, loaded on demand with a dynamic import (opener.ts), so noble and
age-encryption stay out of the first load of every page.
- The release is supplied directly by the person (spec 63, step 10):
drand's JSON answer or the bare signature, pasted after opening the
drand URL the page links to, or the release in the record of an
official fixture. The page never fetches it and reads only its round
and signature (spec 11, 13). The CSP is unchanged.
- time_and_key credentials: a .dkk (readAccessKey reads at most
12 bytes + 16 MiB + 1) or age identities, one per line.
- The plaintext of the person's own file goes to a temporary OPFS file
(tempfile.ts), committed only after step 18 (spec 56), offered for
download and deleted on request, with another capsule, on pagehide
and, if left over, on the next visit. One directory and one Web Lock
per tab keep other tabs' clean-up away from files in use. Without
OPFS, or when the browser refuses it, capsules up to 64 MiB open in
memory. An opening in progress stops when another capsule is loaded.
- opening.ts builds the page model of steps 9 to 18 as the reference
records them; fixtures show their plaintext and compare its SHA-256
with their record.
- licenses.txt: the notices of tlock-js (ibe.ts) and age (bech32.ts),
the license of every package in the client bundle, Vite's and
rolldown's runtime code, and the site's own license. check-build now
fails if a notice is missing, or if a page loads noble, @scure/base
or age-encryption with its first load.
- The home page no longer says that the page never asks for keys.
Checked in the browser on the production build: the time_only,
time_and_key_portable (with its .dkk) and time_and_key_recipients (with
a pasted identity) fixtures open with the SHA-256 of their records; a
tampered signature fails at step 10 and a tampered STREAM chunk at step
17, with no download and no file left; an own file opens to OPFS,
downloads without a CSP violation and is deleted with its lock; a left
over directory goes on the next visit; no request leaves the origin.
An adversarial review (four dimensions, each finding checked by a
refuter) confirmed 15 findings, all fixed here.
2611 tests; coverage 100 % of the new modules, now a threshold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
|
|
|
// The release that the person opening a capsule supplies directly (spec §63
|
|
|
|
|
// step 10): pasted from drand's HTTP API, or taken from the record of an
|
|
|
|
|
// official fixture. The page never fetches it: it links to the drand URL of
|
|
|
|
|
// the round, which the person opens themselves, and verifies what comes back
|
|
|
|
|
// at step 10 like any release the caller supplies (plan of phase 2,
|
|
|
|
|
// decision 4, confirmed by the author on 28-09-2026).
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
Specification 0.16 draft: a seal without accuracy, drand's JSON read strictly
The draft v0.16 of datekeys-go at 4f78854 (branch v0.16): SPEC_VERSION
0.16, and testdata, wordlists and annex synced from that commit. The
annex is §79 of the draft, with the CC BY-ND 4.0 license of the
specification in its title and the key of words in 79.7.
A seal without accuracy proves nothing before the opening date (§29.7,
§29.11, as 7e3b810): a valid seal is S4 only when its token carries
accuracy and t plus the accuracy is before round_time; otherwise S5,
with the first reason that holds: late, no accuracy under the BTSP
policy of ETSI EN 319 421 (0.4.0.2023.1.1), or no accuracy. cms.ts reads
hasAccuracy and the policy of the token (tokenIsBTSP); securitycms.ts
gives SealReason, Detail.sealReason and SignerLine.reason; S5 has no
fixed text any more, and verdictLines writes it and the line of a signer
of F6 with the reason, the texts of Go byte for byte (sealReasonText).
encryptFiles returns the verdicts of the area it wrote in
Encrypted.security, as Result.Security of Go, so that a writer warns of
a seal without accuracy (§62.1 rule 19).
drand's JSON is read strictly (§47.1, as b570338): parseDrandJSON, as
ParseDrandJSON of Go, reads RFC 8259 JSON in valid UTF-8 whose value is
an object, with no name repeated in any object, names compared exactly
once their escapes are decoded, a lone escaped surrogate malformed, the
round a number without sign, fraction or exponent from 1 to 2^53 - 1,
and signature and randomness strings, with the error texts of Go.
ParsedRelease is now a Release: no round above 2^53 - 1 is read. The
page reads the answers of the relays with it (drand.ts), as the client
of Go does, and the pasted release with strictJSON and jsonRound
(release-input.ts), so that it never reads another round than step 10.
Tests: security_cms.json with seal_reason (143 cases), the 38 JSON
inputs of release.json, the new cases of signature2_test.go and
drandjson_test.go (with the escapes written as escapes), and the new
fixtures: format3_time_and_key_words opens with the identity that the
words of its words_text give with normalizeWords and wordKey, in the
library and in the page, and format3_full_chunk, whose PAYLOAD_AGE ends
in a full STREAM chunk, opens. check-build.mjs counts words_text among
the secrets of the fixtures.
Reference files made again with Go at 4f78854: mutation-texts.json (its
spec field only), ibe-vectors.json (the two new fixtures, the rest
unchanged) and signing-vectors.json, in an export of 4f78854 with the
same frozen samples read again: the capsules are the same, and the
tokens of the sealer, without accuracy, now give S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 hours ago
|
|
|
// Of what is pasted only the round and the signature are read, with the
|
|
|
|
|
// strict reader of drand's JSON of the library (spec v0.16, §47.1), so that
|
|
|
|
|
// the page never reads another round than step 10 would: no name twice, names
|
|
|
|
|
// exact, the round a number of 1 to 2^53 - 1. drand's answer also carries
|
|
|
|
|
// `randomness`, and other drand endpoints carry a public key, a period or a
|
|
|
|
|
// chain hash: none of them is read, because the root of trust is the pinned
|
|
|
|
|
// profile and never a remote input (spec §11, §13).
|
Phase 2, step 8: the open action of /inspect
After steps 1 to 8, a valid capsule whose date has passed on the device
clock can be opened in the page: steps 9 to 18 of spec section 63 with
open, loaded on demand with a dynamic import (opener.ts), so noble and
age-encryption stay out of the first load of every page.
- The release is supplied directly by the person (spec 63, step 10):
drand's JSON answer or the bare signature, pasted after opening the
drand URL the page links to, or the release in the record of an
official fixture. The page never fetches it and reads only its round
and signature (spec 11, 13). The CSP is unchanged.
- time_and_key credentials: a .dkk (readAccessKey reads at most
12 bytes + 16 MiB + 1) or age identities, one per line.
- The plaintext of the person's own file goes to a temporary OPFS file
(tempfile.ts), committed only after step 18 (spec 56), offered for
download and deleted on request, with another capsule, on pagehide
and, if left over, on the next visit. One directory and one Web Lock
per tab keep other tabs' clean-up away from files in use. Without
OPFS, or when the browser refuses it, capsules up to 64 MiB open in
memory. An opening in progress stops when another capsule is loaded.
- opening.ts builds the page model of steps 9 to 18 as the reference
records them; fixtures show their plaintext and compare its SHA-256
with their record.
- licenses.txt: the notices of tlock-js (ibe.ts) and age (bech32.ts),
the license of every package in the client bundle, Vite's and
rolldown's runtime code, and the site's own license. check-build now
fails if a notice is missing, or if a page loads noble, @scure/base
or age-encryption with its first load.
- The home page no longer says that the page never asks for keys.
Checked in the browser on the production build: the time_only,
time_and_key_portable (with its .dkk) and time_and_key_recipients (with
a pasted identity) fixtures open with the SHA-256 of their records; a
tampered signature fails at step 10 and a tampered STREAM chunk at step
17, with no download and no file left; an own file opens to OPFS,
downloads without a CSP violation and is deleted with its lock; a left
over directory goes on the next visit; no request leaves the origin.
An adversarial review (four dimensions, each finding checked by a
refuter) confirmed 15 findings, all fixed here.
2611 tests; coverage 100 % of the new modules, now a threshold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
// No noble here: this module is part of the page's initial bundle.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import { fromHex } from '../dkc/index.ts';
|
Specification 0.16 draft: a seal without accuracy, drand's JSON read strictly
The draft v0.16 of datekeys-go at 4f78854 (branch v0.16): SPEC_VERSION
0.16, and testdata, wordlists and annex synced from that commit. The
annex is §79 of the draft, with the CC BY-ND 4.0 license of the
specification in its title and the key of words in 79.7.
A seal without accuracy proves nothing before the opening date (§29.7,
§29.11, as 7e3b810): a valid seal is S4 only when its token carries
accuracy and t plus the accuracy is before round_time; otherwise S5,
with the first reason that holds: late, no accuracy under the BTSP
policy of ETSI EN 319 421 (0.4.0.2023.1.1), or no accuracy. cms.ts reads
hasAccuracy and the policy of the token (tokenIsBTSP); securitycms.ts
gives SealReason, Detail.sealReason and SignerLine.reason; S5 has no
fixed text any more, and verdictLines writes it and the line of a signer
of F6 with the reason, the texts of Go byte for byte (sealReasonText).
encryptFiles returns the verdicts of the area it wrote in
Encrypted.security, as Result.Security of Go, so that a writer warns of
a seal without accuracy (§62.1 rule 19).
drand's JSON is read strictly (§47.1, as b570338): parseDrandJSON, as
ParseDrandJSON of Go, reads RFC 8259 JSON in valid UTF-8 whose value is
an object, with no name repeated in any object, names compared exactly
once their escapes are decoded, a lone escaped surrogate malformed, the
round a number without sign, fraction or exponent from 1 to 2^53 - 1,
and signature and randomness strings, with the error texts of Go.
ParsedRelease is now a Release: no round above 2^53 - 1 is read. The
page reads the answers of the relays with it (drand.ts), as the client
of Go does, and the pasted release with strictJSON and jsonRound
(release-input.ts), so that it never reads another round than step 10.
Tests: security_cms.json with seal_reason (143 cases), the 38 JSON
inputs of release.json, the new cases of signature2_test.go and
drandjson_test.go (with the escapes written as escapes), and the new
fixtures: format3_time_and_key_words opens with the identity that the
words of its words_text give with normalizeWords and wordKey, in the
library and in the page, and format3_full_chunk, whose PAYLOAD_AGE ends
in a full STREAM chunk, opens. check-build.mjs counts words_text among
the secrets of the fixtures.
Reference files made again with Go at 4f78854: mutation-texts.json (its
spec field only), ibe-vectors.json (the two new fixtures, the rest
unchanged) and signing-vectors.json, in an export of 4f78854 with the
same frozen samples read again: the capsules are the same, and the
tokens of the sealer, without accuracy, now give S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 hours ago
|
|
|
import { jsonRound, strictJSON } from '../dkc/releaseobject.ts';
|
Phase 2, step 8: the open action of /inspect
After steps 1 to 8, a valid capsule whose date has passed on the device
clock can be opened in the page: steps 9 to 18 of spec section 63 with
open, loaded on demand with a dynamic import (opener.ts), so noble and
age-encryption stay out of the first load of every page.
- The release is supplied directly by the person (spec 63, step 10):
drand's JSON answer or the bare signature, pasted after opening the
drand URL the page links to, or the release in the record of an
official fixture. The page never fetches it and reads only its round
and signature (spec 11, 13). The CSP is unchanged.
- time_and_key credentials: a .dkk (readAccessKey reads at most
12 bytes + 16 MiB + 1) or age identities, one per line.
- The plaintext of the person's own file goes to a temporary OPFS file
(tempfile.ts), committed only after step 18 (spec 56), offered for
download and deleted on request, with another capsule, on pagehide
and, if left over, on the next visit. One directory and one Web Lock
per tab keep other tabs' clean-up away from files in use. Without
OPFS, or when the browser refuses it, capsules up to 64 MiB open in
memory. An opening in progress stops when another capsule is loaded.
- opening.ts builds the page model of steps 9 to 18 as the reference
records them; fixtures show their plaintext and compare its SHA-256
with their record.
- licenses.txt: the notices of tlock-js (ibe.ts) and age (bech32.ts),
the license of every package in the client bundle, Vite's and
rolldown's runtime code, and the site's own license. check-build now
fails if a notice is missing, or if a page loads noble, @scure/base
or age-encryption with its first load.
- The home page no longer says that the page never asks for keys.
Checked in the browser on the production build: the time_only,
time_and_key_portable (with its .dkk) and time_and_key_recipients (with
a pasted identity) fixtures open with the SHA-256 of their records; a
tampered signature fails at step 10 and a tampered STREAM chunk at step
17, with no download and no file left; an own file opens to OPFS,
downloads without a CSP violation and is deleted with its lock; a left
over directory goes on the next visit; no request leaves the origin.
An adversarial review (four dimensions, each finding checked by a
refuter) confirmed 15 findings, all fixed here.
2611 tests; coverage 100 % of the new modules, now a threshold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** A release as the caller supplies it, before any verification. */
|
|
|
|
|
export interface SuppliedRelease {
|
|
|
|
|
readonly round: number;
|
|
|
|
|
readonly signature: Uint8Array;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** The longest text read as a release: drand's answer is about 230 characters. */
|
|
|
|
|
export const MAX_RELEASE_TEXT = 4096;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** What the person pasted, read as a release, or why it cannot be. */
|
|
|
|
|
export type ReleaseInput =
|
|
|
|
|
| { readonly ok: true; readonly release: SuppliedRelease; readonly form: 'json' | 'hex' }
|
|
|
|
|
| { readonly ok: false; readonly problem: string };
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* Reads the text pasted as the release of `round`: drand's JSON answer,
|
|
|
|
|
* `{"round": …, "signature": "…"}`, or a signature alone in hexadecimal,
|
|
|
|
|
* which is then taken as the release of `round`. Nothing is verified here:
|
|
|
|
|
* a round other than `round` or a signature that is not a valid one goes to
|
|
|
|
|
* step 10, which reports it with its normative code.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
export function parseReleaseText(text: string, round: number): ReleaseInput {
|
|
|
|
|
const s = text.trim();
|
|
|
|
|
if (s === '') return { ok: false, problem: 'Pega la respuesta de drand o la firma de la ronda.' };
|
|
|
|
|
if (s.length > MAX_RELEASE_TEXT) {
|
|
|
|
|
return { ok: false, problem: `El texto pegado tiene ${s.length} caracteres; la respuesta de drand tiene unos 230.` };
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (s.startsWith('{')) return fromJSON(s);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(s) || s.length % 2 !== 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
ok: false,
|
|
|
|
|
problem: 'No es la respuesta de drand (un objeto JSON) ni una firma en hexadecimal (un número par de cifras 0-9 y a-f).',
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return { ok: true, release: { round, signature: fromHex(s) }, form: 'hex' };
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function fromJSON(s: string): ReleaseInput {
|
Specification 0.16 draft: a seal without accuracy, drand's JSON read strictly
The draft v0.16 of datekeys-go at 4f78854 (branch v0.16): SPEC_VERSION
0.16, and testdata, wordlists and annex synced from that commit. The
annex is §79 of the draft, with the CC BY-ND 4.0 license of the
specification in its title and the key of words in 79.7.
A seal without accuracy proves nothing before the opening date (§29.7,
§29.11, as 7e3b810): a valid seal is S4 only when its token carries
accuracy and t plus the accuracy is before round_time; otherwise S5,
with the first reason that holds: late, no accuracy under the BTSP
policy of ETSI EN 319 421 (0.4.0.2023.1.1), or no accuracy. cms.ts reads
hasAccuracy and the policy of the token (tokenIsBTSP); securitycms.ts
gives SealReason, Detail.sealReason and SignerLine.reason; S5 has no
fixed text any more, and verdictLines writes it and the line of a signer
of F6 with the reason, the texts of Go byte for byte (sealReasonText).
encryptFiles returns the verdicts of the area it wrote in
Encrypted.security, as Result.Security of Go, so that a writer warns of
a seal without accuracy (§62.1 rule 19).
drand's JSON is read strictly (§47.1, as b570338): parseDrandJSON, as
ParseDrandJSON of Go, reads RFC 8259 JSON in valid UTF-8 whose value is
an object, with no name repeated in any object, names compared exactly
once their escapes are decoded, a lone escaped surrogate malformed, the
round a number without sign, fraction or exponent from 1 to 2^53 - 1,
and signature and randomness strings, with the error texts of Go.
ParsedRelease is now a Release: no round above 2^53 - 1 is read. The
page reads the answers of the relays with it (drand.ts), as the client
of Go does, and the pasted release with strictJSON and jsonRound
(release-input.ts), so that it never reads another round than step 10.
Tests: security_cms.json with seal_reason (143 cases), the 38 JSON
inputs of release.json, the new cases of signature2_test.go and
drandjson_test.go (with the escapes written as escapes), and the new
fixtures: format3_time_and_key_words opens with the identity that the
words of its words_text give with normalizeWords and wordKey, in the
library and in the page, and format3_full_chunk, whose PAYLOAD_AGE ends
in a full STREAM chunk, opens. check-build.mjs counts words_text among
the secrets of the fixtures.
Reference files made again with Go at 4f78854: mutation-texts.json (its
spec field only), ibe-vectors.json (the two new fixtures, the rest
unchanged) and signing-vectors.json, in an export of 4f78854 with the
same frozen samples read again: the capsules are the same, and the
tokens of the sealer, without accuracy, now give S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 hours ago
|
|
|
// JSON text that starts with { and that the strict reader reads is an
|
|
|
|
|
// object without a name twice.
|
|
|
|
|
const members = strictJSON(new TextEncoder().encode(s));
|
|
|
|
|
if (members === undefined) {
|
Phase 2, step 8: the open action of /inspect
After steps 1 to 8, a valid capsule whose date has passed on the device
clock can be opened in the page: steps 9 to 18 of spec section 63 with
open, loaded on demand with a dynamic import (opener.ts), so noble and
age-encryption stay out of the first load of every page.
- The release is supplied directly by the person (spec 63, step 10):
drand's JSON answer or the bare signature, pasted after opening the
drand URL the page links to, or the release in the record of an
official fixture. The page never fetches it and reads only its round
and signature (spec 11, 13). The CSP is unchanged.
- time_and_key credentials: a .dkk (readAccessKey reads at most
12 bytes + 16 MiB + 1) or age identities, one per line.
- The plaintext of the person's own file goes to a temporary OPFS file
(tempfile.ts), committed only after step 18 (spec 56), offered for
download and deleted on request, with another capsule, on pagehide
and, if left over, on the next visit. One directory and one Web Lock
per tab keep other tabs' clean-up away from files in use. Without
OPFS, or when the browser refuses it, capsules up to 64 MiB open in
memory. An opening in progress stops when another capsule is loaded.
- opening.ts builds the page model of steps 9 to 18 as the reference
records them; fixtures show their plaintext and compare its SHA-256
with their record.
- licenses.txt: the notices of tlock-js (ibe.ts) and age (bech32.ts),
the license of every package in the client bundle, Vite's and
rolldown's runtime code, and the site's own license. check-build now
fails if a notice is missing, or if a page loads noble, @scure/base
or age-encryption with its first load.
- The home page no longer says that the page never asks for keys.
Checked in the browser on the production build: the time_only,
time_and_key_portable (with its .dkk) and time_and_key_recipients (with
a pasted identity) fixtures open with the SHA-256 of their records; a
tampered signature fails at step 10 and a tampered STREAM chunk at step
17, with no download and no file left; an own file opens to OPFS,
downloads without a CSP violation and is deleted with its lock; a left
over directory goes on the next visit; no request leaves the origin.
An adversarial review (four dimensions, each finding checked by a
refuter) confirmed 15 findings, all fixed here.
2611 tests; coverage 100 % of the new modules, now a threshold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
|
|
|
return { ok: false, problem: 'Empieza por { pero no es JSON válido. Copia la respuesta de drand entera.' };
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
Specification 0.16 draft: a seal without accuracy, drand's JSON read strictly
The draft v0.16 of datekeys-go at 4f78854 (branch v0.16): SPEC_VERSION
0.16, and testdata, wordlists and annex synced from that commit. The
annex is §79 of the draft, with the CC BY-ND 4.0 license of the
specification in its title and the key of words in 79.7.
A seal without accuracy proves nothing before the opening date (§29.7,
§29.11, as 7e3b810): a valid seal is S4 only when its token carries
accuracy and t plus the accuracy is before round_time; otherwise S5,
with the first reason that holds: late, no accuracy under the BTSP
policy of ETSI EN 319 421 (0.4.0.2023.1.1), or no accuracy. cms.ts reads
hasAccuracy and the policy of the token (tokenIsBTSP); securitycms.ts
gives SealReason, Detail.sealReason and SignerLine.reason; S5 has no
fixed text any more, and verdictLines writes it and the line of a signer
of F6 with the reason, the texts of Go byte for byte (sealReasonText).
encryptFiles returns the verdicts of the area it wrote in
Encrypted.security, as Result.Security of Go, so that a writer warns of
a seal without accuracy (§62.1 rule 19).
drand's JSON is read strictly (§47.1, as b570338): parseDrandJSON, as
ParseDrandJSON of Go, reads RFC 8259 JSON in valid UTF-8 whose value is
an object, with no name repeated in any object, names compared exactly
once their escapes are decoded, a lone escaped surrogate malformed, the
round a number without sign, fraction or exponent from 1 to 2^53 - 1,
and signature and randomness strings, with the error texts of Go.
ParsedRelease is now a Release: no round above 2^53 - 1 is read. The
page reads the answers of the relays with it (drand.ts), as the client
of Go does, and the pasted release with strictJSON and jsonRound
(release-input.ts), so that it never reads another round than step 10.
Tests: security_cms.json with seal_reason (143 cases), the 38 JSON
inputs of release.json, the new cases of signature2_test.go and
drandjson_test.go (with the escapes written as escapes), and the new
fixtures: format3_time_and_key_words opens with the identity that the
words of its words_text give with normalizeWords and wordKey, in the
library and in the page, and format3_full_chunk, whose PAYLOAD_AGE ends
in a full STREAM chunk, opens. check-build.mjs counts words_text among
the secrets of the fixtures.
Reference files made again with Go at 4f78854: mutation-texts.json (its
spec field only), ibe-vectors.json (the two new fixtures, the rest
unchanged) and signing-vectors.json, in an export of 4f78854 with the
same frozen samples read again: the capsules are the same, and the
tokens of the sealer, without accuracy, now give S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 hours ago
|
|
|
const member = (name: string) => members.find((m) => m.name === name);
|
|
|
|
|
const r = member('round');
|
|
|
|
|
const round = r === undefined ? undefined : jsonRound(r);
|
|
|
|
|
if (round === undefined) {
|
Phase 2, step 8: the open action of /inspect
After steps 1 to 8, a valid capsule whose date has passed on the device
clock can be opened in the page: steps 9 to 18 of spec section 63 with
open, loaded on demand with a dynamic import (opener.ts), so noble and
age-encryption stay out of the first load of every page.
- The release is supplied directly by the person (spec 63, step 10):
drand's JSON answer or the bare signature, pasted after opening the
drand URL the page links to, or the release in the record of an
official fixture. The page never fetches it and reads only its round
and signature (spec 11, 13). The CSP is unchanged.
- time_and_key credentials: a .dkk (readAccessKey reads at most
12 bytes + 16 MiB + 1) or age identities, one per line.
- The plaintext of the person's own file goes to a temporary OPFS file
(tempfile.ts), committed only after step 18 (spec 56), offered for
download and deleted on request, with another capsule, on pagehide
and, if left over, on the next visit. One directory and one Web Lock
per tab keep other tabs' clean-up away from files in use. Without
OPFS, or when the browser refuses it, capsules up to 64 MiB open in
memory. An opening in progress stops when another capsule is loaded.
- opening.ts builds the page model of steps 9 to 18 as the reference
records them; fixtures show their plaintext and compare its SHA-256
with their record.
- licenses.txt: the notices of tlock-js (ibe.ts) and age (bech32.ts),
the license of every package in the client bundle, Vite's and
rolldown's runtime code, and the site's own license. check-build now
fails if a notice is missing, or if a page loads noble, @scure/base
or age-encryption with its first load.
- The home page no longer says that the page never asks for keys.
Checked in the browser on the production build: the time_only,
time_and_key_portable (with its .dkk) and time_and_key_recipients (with
a pasted identity) fixtures open with the SHA-256 of their records; a
tampered signature fails at step 10 and a tampered STREAM chunk at step
17, with no download and no file left; an own file opens to OPFS,
downloads without a CSP violation and is deleted with its lock; a left
over directory goes on the next visit; no request leaves the origin.
An adversarial review (four dimensions, each finding checked by a
refuter) confirmed 15 findings, all fixed here.
2611 tests; coverage 100 % of the new modules, now a threshold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
|
|
|
return { ok: false, problem: 'El campo round falta o no es un número entero de ronda.' };
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
Specification 0.16 draft: a seal without accuracy, drand's JSON read strictly
The draft v0.16 of datekeys-go at 4f78854 (branch v0.16): SPEC_VERSION
0.16, and testdata, wordlists and annex synced from that commit. The
annex is §79 of the draft, with the CC BY-ND 4.0 license of the
specification in its title and the key of words in 79.7.
A seal without accuracy proves nothing before the opening date (§29.7,
§29.11, as 7e3b810): a valid seal is S4 only when its token carries
accuracy and t plus the accuracy is before round_time; otherwise S5,
with the first reason that holds: late, no accuracy under the BTSP
policy of ETSI EN 319 421 (0.4.0.2023.1.1), or no accuracy. cms.ts reads
hasAccuracy and the policy of the token (tokenIsBTSP); securitycms.ts
gives SealReason, Detail.sealReason and SignerLine.reason; S5 has no
fixed text any more, and verdictLines writes it and the line of a signer
of F6 with the reason, the texts of Go byte for byte (sealReasonText).
encryptFiles returns the verdicts of the area it wrote in
Encrypted.security, as Result.Security of Go, so that a writer warns of
a seal without accuracy (§62.1 rule 19).
drand's JSON is read strictly (§47.1, as b570338): parseDrandJSON, as
ParseDrandJSON of Go, reads RFC 8259 JSON in valid UTF-8 whose value is
an object, with no name repeated in any object, names compared exactly
once their escapes are decoded, a lone escaped surrogate malformed, the
round a number without sign, fraction or exponent from 1 to 2^53 - 1,
and signature and randomness strings, with the error texts of Go.
ParsedRelease is now a Release: no round above 2^53 - 1 is read. The
page reads the answers of the relays with it (drand.ts), as the client
of Go does, and the pasted release with strictJSON and jsonRound
(release-input.ts), so that it never reads another round than step 10.
Tests: security_cms.json with seal_reason (143 cases), the 38 JSON
inputs of release.json, the new cases of signature2_test.go and
drandjson_test.go (with the escapes written as escapes), and the new
fixtures: format3_time_and_key_words opens with the identity that the
words of its words_text give with normalizeWords and wordKey, in the
library and in the page, and format3_full_chunk, whose PAYLOAD_AGE ends
in a full STREAM chunk, opens. check-build.mjs counts words_text among
the secrets of the fixtures.
Reference files made again with Go at 4f78854: mutation-texts.json (its
spec field only), ibe-vectors.json (the two new fixtures, the rest
unchanged) and signing-vectors.json, in an export of 4f78854 with the
same frozen samples read again: the capsules are the same, and the
tokens of the sealer, without accuracy, now give S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 hours ago
|
|
|
const signature = member('signature');
|
|
|
|
|
if (signature?.kind !== '"' || !/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{2})+$/.test(signature.str)) {
|
Phase 2, step 8: the open action of /inspect
After steps 1 to 8, a valid capsule whose date has passed on the device
clock can be opened in the page: steps 9 to 18 of spec section 63 with
open, loaded on demand with a dynamic import (opener.ts), so noble and
age-encryption stay out of the first load of every page.
- The release is supplied directly by the person (spec 63, step 10):
drand's JSON answer or the bare signature, pasted after opening the
drand URL the page links to, or the release in the record of an
official fixture. The page never fetches it and reads only its round
and signature (spec 11, 13). The CSP is unchanged.
- time_and_key credentials: a .dkk (readAccessKey reads at most
12 bytes + 16 MiB + 1) or age identities, one per line.
- The plaintext of the person's own file goes to a temporary OPFS file
(tempfile.ts), committed only after step 18 (spec 56), offered for
download and deleted on request, with another capsule, on pagehide
and, if left over, on the next visit. One directory and one Web Lock
per tab keep other tabs' clean-up away from files in use. Without
OPFS, or when the browser refuses it, capsules up to 64 MiB open in
memory. An opening in progress stops when another capsule is loaded.
- opening.ts builds the page model of steps 9 to 18 as the reference
records them; fixtures show their plaintext and compare its SHA-256
with their record.
- licenses.txt: the notices of tlock-js (ibe.ts) and age (bech32.ts),
the license of every package in the client bundle, Vite's and
rolldown's runtime code, and the site's own license. check-build now
fails if a notice is missing, or if a page loads noble, @scure/base
or age-encryption with its first load.
- The home page no longer says that the page never asks for keys.
Checked in the browser on the production build: the time_only,
time_and_key_portable (with its .dkk) and time_and_key_recipients (with
a pasted identity) fixtures open with the SHA-256 of their records; a
tampered signature fails at step 10 and a tampered STREAM chunk at step
17, with no download and no file left; an own file opens to OPFS,
downloads without a CSP violation and is deleted with its lock; a left
over directory goes on the next visit; no request leaves the origin.
An adversarial review (four dimensions, each finding checked by a
refuter) confirmed 15 findings, all fixed here.
2611 tests; coverage 100 % of the new modules, now a threshold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
|
|
|
return { ok: false, problem: 'El campo signature falta o no es hexadecimal.' };
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
Specification 0.16 draft: a seal without accuracy, drand's JSON read strictly
The draft v0.16 of datekeys-go at 4f78854 (branch v0.16): SPEC_VERSION
0.16, and testdata, wordlists and annex synced from that commit. The
annex is §79 of the draft, with the CC BY-ND 4.0 license of the
specification in its title and the key of words in 79.7.
A seal without accuracy proves nothing before the opening date (§29.7,
§29.11, as 7e3b810): a valid seal is S4 only when its token carries
accuracy and t plus the accuracy is before round_time; otherwise S5,
with the first reason that holds: late, no accuracy under the BTSP
policy of ETSI EN 319 421 (0.4.0.2023.1.1), or no accuracy. cms.ts reads
hasAccuracy and the policy of the token (tokenIsBTSP); securitycms.ts
gives SealReason, Detail.sealReason and SignerLine.reason; S5 has no
fixed text any more, and verdictLines writes it and the line of a signer
of F6 with the reason, the texts of Go byte for byte (sealReasonText).
encryptFiles returns the verdicts of the area it wrote in
Encrypted.security, as Result.Security of Go, so that a writer warns of
a seal without accuracy (§62.1 rule 19).
drand's JSON is read strictly (§47.1, as b570338): parseDrandJSON, as
ParseDrandJSON of Go, reads RFC 8259 JSON in valid UTF-8 whose value is
an object, with no name repeated in any object, names compared exactly
once their escapes are decoded, a lone escaped surrogate malformed, the
round a number without sign, fraction or exponent from 1 to 2^53 - 1,
and signature and randomness strings, with the error texts of Go.
ParsedRelease is now a Release: no round above 2^53 - 1 is read. The
page reads the answers of the relays with it (drand.ts), as the client
of Go does, and the pasted release with strictJSON and jsonRound
(release-input.ts), so that it never reads another round than step 10.
Tests: security_cms.json with seal_reason (143 cases), the 38 JSON
inputs of release.json, the new cases of signature2_test.go and
drandjson_test.go (with the escapes written as escapes), and the new
fixtures: format3_time_and_key_words opens with the identity that the
words of its words_text give with normalizeWords and wordKey, in the
library and in the page, and format3_full_chunk, whose PAYLOAD_AGE ends
in a full STREAM chunk, opens. check-build.mjs counts words_text among
the secrets of the fixtures.
Reference files made again with Go at 4f78854: mutation-texts.json (its
spec field only), ibe-vectors.json (the two new fixtures, the rest
unchanged) and signing-vectors.json, in an export of 4f78854 with the
same frozen samples read again: the capsules are the same, and the
tokens of the sealer, without accuracy, now give S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 hours ago
|
|
|
return { ok: true, release: { round, signature: fromHex(signature.str) }, form: 'json' };
|
Phase 2, step 8: the open action of /inspect
After steps 1 to 8, a valid capsule whose date has passed on the device
clock can be opened in the page: steps 9 to 18 of spec section 63 with
open, loaded on demand with a dynamic import (opener.ts), so noble and
age-encryption stay out of the first load of every page.
- The release is supplied directly by the person (spec 63, step 10):
drand's JSON answer or the bare signature, pasted after opening the
drand URL the page links to, or the release in the record of an
official fixture. The page never fetches it and reads only its round
and signature (spec 11, 13). The CSP is unchanged.
- time_and_key credentials: a .dkk (readAccessKey reads at most
12 bytes + 16 MiB + 1) or age identities, one per line.
- The plaintext of the person's own file goes to a temporary OPFS file
(tempfile.ts), committed only after step 18 (spec 56), offered for
download and deleted on request, with another capsule, on pagehide
and, if left over, on the next visit. One directory and one Web Lock
per tab keep other tabs' clean-up away from files in use. Without
OPFS, or when the browser refuses it, capsules up to 64 MiB open in
memory. An opening in progress stops when another capsule is loaded.
- opening.ts builds the page model of steps 9 to 18 as the reference
records them; fixtures show their plaintext and compare its SHA-256
with their record.
- licenses.txt: the notices of tlock-js (ibe.ts) and age (bech32.ts),
the license of every package in the client bundle, Vite's and
rolldown's runtime code, and the site's own license. check-build now
fails if a notice is missing, or if a page loads noble, @scure/base
or age-encryption with its first load.
- The home page no longer says that the page never asks for keys.
Checked in the browser on the production build: the time_only,
time_and_key_portable (with its .dkk) and time_and_key_recipients (with
a pasted identity) fixtures open with the SHA-256 of their records; a
tampered signature fails at step 10 and a tampered STREAM chunk at step
17, with no download and no file left; an own file opens to OPFS,
downloads without a CSP violation and is deleted with its lock; a left
over directory goes on the next visit; no request leaves the origin.
An adversarial review (four dimensions, each finding checked by a
refuter) confirmed 15 findings, all fixed here.
2611 tests; coverage 100 % of the new modules, now a threshold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 week ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* The drand HTTP API URL of the release of `round` on the network of the
|
|
|
|
|
* chain hash `chainHash` (lowercase hexadecimal), for the person to open:
|
|
|
|
|
* https://api.drand.sh/<chain hash>/public/<round>. The page links to it and
|
|
|
|
|
* never fetches it.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
export function drandReleaseURL(chainHash: string, round: number): string {
|
|
|
|
|
return `https://api.drand.sh/${chainHash}/public/${round}`;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** The JSON text of a release, as drand writes its round and signature. */
|
|
|
|
|
export function releaseText(round: number, signatureHex: string): string {
|
|
|
|
|
return JSON.stringify({ round, signature: signatureHex });
|
|
|
|
|
}
|